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This dissertation paper is based on the decision of the Wal-Mart cases in respect 
to competition law, mergers and acquisition in Namibia. Owing to the fact that 
Namibian law is mostly derived from South African law, the exploration and 
analysis will be based on both Wal-Mart cases in Namibia and South Africa in 
respect of the subject matter with specific particularity on the significance of the 
court‟s judgment to competition law development in Namibia.  
 
The paper will also contain an exposition of the High Court and Supreme Court‟s 
judgment in Namibia as well as the judgment of the South African Court on the 
same subject respectively. This is aimed at providing an in-depth understanding of 
the approaches taken by the two courts with respect to mergers and also to derive 
guidelines from the interpretation of the court in South Africa owing to the fact 
that the court in South Africa has successfully and efficiently dealt with the same 
issues many times compared to the Namibian courts. The guidelines that will be 
looked at will be based on how the courts in Namibia and South Africa have 
applied and interpreted the provisions within the Act pertaining to statutory 
granting or refusal of mergers in the sphere of competition law with specific 
reference to the question of public interest. An analysis on the respective 
judgments will be provided. In the final, a conclusion will be drawn and 
recommendations made on the way forward for the Namibian courts. That is, 





South African courts when determining the question of mergers intertwined with 
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General expose and background to the study 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with introductory issues. Distinctively the chapter drapes 
the background to the study, provides a delineation of the problems to be tackled 
in the dissertation and the methodology followed in the research process. It is 
through the statement of the problem that the objectives of the study are derived 
and it is through the objectives that a turn of phrase of the research problems is 
had. These aspects of this dissertation call for a rationalisation of the research 
hence this chapter also shows the purpose, import and significance of the 
research.  
Once the problems have been exposed and questions posed, an apt 
methodology was selected. This chapter thus proceeds to give the raison d'être 
and advantages for the employ of such methodology. Each methodology and 
instruments used has its own problems or weaknesses, thus it is the idea of this 
chapter to also show the flaws or research confines under the subject matter being 
considered. 
In addition and very important, this chapter also provides some succinct 
literature review. The literature available is narrow especially in the Namibian 
context because not much has been written on the subject compared to South 
Africa because competition law is a relatively new concept.  However, it gives a 
general depiction of what some authors have put on the table which might be of 
bearing or swaying nature to the dynamics and various multi-disciplinary and 
multi-dimensional twists in the Wal-Mart case under consideration.  
1.2 Background to the study 
The fact that business organisations expand their activities across the globe 
brings with it some challenges to various actors in the global economy both at 
micro and macro levels. One of the most challenging parts is when multinational 





findings have established that by going on an international scale organisations 
benefit by expanding their markets and profit margins. It is such driving factors 
that propelled companies like Wal-Mart to expand its business across the African 
continent and that did not come without challenges and one of such challenges is 
competition to local business enterprises as this dissertation will show. 
Hyslop1 defines competition law as the rules and regulations put in place by a 
country‟s local government to guide the operations of international business 
investors against the exploitation of local companies. This is done to ensure 
equality and fairness in business. 
Part of the reasons that made Wal-Mart to invest in Africa include the fact 
that the local business markets in Wal-Mart‟s countries of operation were 
saturated thus the need for it to find new market, its baseline survey indicated the 
possibilities of bigger markets in Africa and finally it was driven by the external 
and interior urge for the new business opportunities that would be created. This 
then found Wal-Mart setting its investment foot in Namibia in the process. Wal-
Mart has found itself embroiled in legal battles as it tries to penetrate the African 
markets; hence the seminal case in Namibia which forms the crux of this 
dissertation. 
The Wal-Mart case2 in Namibia and South Africa indicates that any company 
aiming at expanding across its continent of operation need to conduct a thorough 
market segmentation research. As Thorpe3 explains, a few exploration studies 
have reasoned that retailers can minimise the risks of venturing into new markets 
by carefully selecting their target markets from the social, geographical and 
development aspects. Further when expansion of global enterprises happens that 
is when the concept of competition law is widely applied.  
                                                 
1 M Hyslop Obstructive marketing: Restricting distribution of products and services in the age of 
asymmetric warfare (2014). Gower Publishing New York.  
2 Wal-Mart//Massmart holdings Wal-Mart stores Inc v Chairperson of the Namibian Competition 
Commission and others (A 61/2011)[2011] NAHC 126 (28 April 2011) 





1.3 Statement of the problem 
Despite having a Competition Act in force to regulate competition in the market, 
the competitors in Namibia are still not on an equal footing. The multi-national 
corporations are much more powerful than the local corporations. They can out-
manoeuvre the local corporations in competition. This is owed to the fact that Wal-
Mart has all the necessary resources e.g. advanced technology to market itself through 
its supply chain, expertise as well as capital to enable it to expand its business across 
the world. This outplays local businesses as they might not have the same resources 
and skills available to them compared to Wal-Mart.The Wal-Mart case has created a 
precedent that had never been in existence before in the country under a very young 
regulatory framework. It is important to consider the implications of this case as 
decided by both the High Court and the Supreme Court of Namibia. 
Protecting the interest of the consumers i.e. consumer welfare and public interest 
and ensuring that entrepreneurs have an opportunity to compete in the market 
economy are often treated as important objectives of competition law. The current law 
contains these elements but it must also be noted that competition law is closely 
connected with law on deregulation of access to markets, state aids and subsidies, the 
privatisation of state owned assets and the establishment of independent sector 
regulators. The question arises whether these seemingly conflicting interests were 
adequately balanced by both or either of the courts when they decided the Wal-Mart 
case. 
Further, in recent decades, Competition law has been viewed as a way to provide 
better public service. Robert Bork has argued that competition laws can produce 
adverse effects when they reduce competition by protecting inefficient competitors 
and when costs of legal intervention are greater than benefits for the consumers. The 
question then arises in regards to the Ministerial review process in the Competition 
Act. The Act puts enough safeguards against anti-competitive mergers like the 
Massmart/Wal-Mart merger. Further one would wonder why the process should 





body to deal with the matter under a statute. These questions boil down to the ultimate 
enquiry: How/what has the legal precedent of the Wal-Mart case paved in the history 
of competition law in Namibia? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The major objectives of this research include the following: 
 To identify the approach adopted by the courts in Namibia when dealing 
with mergers in comparison to the judgment and or approach taken by the 
South African court in a similar Wal-Mart case 
 To highlight why one of the approaches adopted by one of the two courts 
is preferred over the other based on the facts and issues that were place 
before the courts.  
 To highlight the provisions of sections 49 of the Namibia Competition 
Act and argue whether the procedural step provided therein is appropriate 
in decision making in the context of competition regulation in the 
country. 
 To examine how and what the legal precedent of the Wal-Mart case has 
paved in the history of competition law in Namibia.  
1.5 Research Questions 
From the foregoing objectives the following research questions can be formulated 
and have to be answered through a methodology chosen below; 
 What are the approaches used by the Namibian courts when dealing with 
mergers as compared to similar approaches taken by the South African 
court in a Wal-Mart case? 
 Why was one approach preferred over the other in these cases?  
 What are the provisions and impacts of s49 of the Namibia Competition 
Act in decision making? 
 How/what has the legal precedent of the Wal-Mart case paved in the 





1.6 Purpose and importance of the Study 
It must be noted that the concept of mergers has gained serious attention and 
momentum in Namibia over the past three years since the inception and the saga 
that was fuelled by the merger/takeover of the multi-million dollar company Wal-
Mart of some of its supply chain companies in Namibia. The Wal-Mart case in 
Namibia left such a great significance and legal precedent regarding mergers, the 
role and importance of competition law and the Competition Commission of 
Namibia (NaCC) in its endeavour to implement and enforce the competition law 
in the Republic. To this end the dissertation seeks to explore the current legal 
provisions that regulate mergers/acquisitions in Namibia in light of the 
Competition Act 3 of 2003 [„the Act‟]. 
The purpose of this dissertation is not to analyse which judgment was the 
better judgment but to show why one of the approaches adopted by one of the two 
courts is or would be more preferred over the other based on the facts and issues 
that were place before the courts. Further the paper will also delve into the 
provisions of s49 of the Act which provides for the Ministerial review process in 
terms of the Namibian Competition Act. It will examine whether or not such 
procedural step is appropriate and necessary or not in terms of the NaCC decision 
making powers.  
In addition, this paper will examine the legal precedent that the Wal-Mart 
case has paved in the history of competition law in Namibia. Finally, conclusions 
will be drawn and recommendations made on the current merger situation in 
Namibia as derived from the approaches adopted by the courts in Namibia and 
South Africa respectively. 
A case study will be done on the judgments of the High Court and Supreme 
Court in the case of Wal-Mart//Massmart holdings Wal-Mart stores Inc v 
Chairperson of the Namibian Competition Commission and others4 which is the 
only prominent Namibian case that has ever dealt with the issue of mergers of an 
international magnitude and the concept of public interest.  
                                                 





This study is important as it will show and analyse the approach of 
interpretation and application of the law adopted by the courts in Namibia when 
dealing with mergers. This will be done in comparison to the judgment and or 
approach taken by the South African court in a similar Wal-Mart case which dealt 
with issues of the same nature. The purpose of this is to enable the Namibian 
courts to be able to use the discretion vested in them in light of the ability to make 
judgments that are not only just but which also include and embrace the concept 
of public interest. This can only be achieved by carrying out an analysis of the 
provisions of the Act and judgments respectively so as to determine whether the 
courts are at par in their interpretations and applications of the relevant sections or 
whether they can borrow from each other in order to give the provisions the true 
and proper meaning as envisaged and intended by the legislature.  
1.7 Research methodology 
     The research questions above have to be answered through a well-chosen 
methodology. In research there are two general methods used, which are quantitative and 
qualitative methods. According to Bjokluind and Paulson,5 the quantitative method is 
used in studies where information aims to measure and score statistical processes as well 
as numerical observations. The exercise of mathematical models is frequently used in 
quantitative methods. Information and data used is not affected by the researcher‟s 
subjective values and influences. Qualitative methods on the other hand are used when 
the research aims to create a deeper understanding and a more detailed analysis of 
specific phenomena such as competition in the commercial world, which is the objective 
of this study. 
       Further qualitative method is a relatively more in-depth research method because 
during this method, reliability is difficult to ensure due to personality and communication 
barriers. The method which was used in this research was the qualitative methods were 
data was collected through largely desk research. 
      In the light of the foregoing methodology, it should be observed that Namibian courts 
usually have recourse to international law, including jurisprudence of municipal 
                                                 





jurisdictions with similar constitutional models as persuasive aid in the interpretation of 
statutory law. Therefore South African case law is referred to, taking into consideration 
the fact that the Competition law legislation applicable in South Africa is very similar to 
the Competition Act applicable in Namibia. 
     Furthermore, this study also uses the case study technique under the same 
qualitative methodology. According to Stakes: 
‘the sole criterion for selecting cases for a case study should be the opportunity to learn, and 
where multiple cases are involved, it is referred to as a collective study. It appears that these five 
strategies and/or traditions of qualitative research are selected due to the fact that they have 
proven themselves beyond reasonable doubt as representative of common practice in different 
disciplines in qualitative inquiry.‟6 
 
   Therefore the Wal-Mart case is analysed in the context and imperatives of this 
methodology. The Wal-Mart case seems to be the representative of many issues 
arising in global competition laws as we note that Wal-Mart is involved in many 
competition disputes across the world with similar issues being addressed by the 
courts in these various countries. 
 
The eventual result expected by researcher was a more systematic explanation or even a 
conceptual framework or general understanding of the effects of the Wal-Mart case to the 
legal precedent of Namibian Competition Law in general and what recommendations can be 
developed out of the result of the answers to the research questions. 
The research methodology employed for achieving the above task has to cater for the 
dialectical nature of critical research. One way of doing this is action research, which is a 
common methodology that involves the researcher into the actual business of obtaining 
and producing data amenable to better understanding and change.7 The practical 
engagement of a researcher in Competition law led to a situation whereby the researcher 
was herself involved in data collection and analysis in order to make conclusions as to the 
effects of the approved merger between Massmart and Wal-Mart and upon those 
conclusions make possible recommendations. 
  
                                                 
6 R Stake The Art of Case Study Research (1995) Thousand Oaks Sage. 





1.8 Limitations of the Study  
The research study is limited to the different literature gathered through only 
desk research. This study did not perform rigorous mathematical analysis 
meaning that the qualitative method was followed. Restriction to qualitative 
exploratory research is: 
 The interpretation of findings and analysis is based on judgment. 
 The ability to generalise results is limited. 
 
1.9 Literature Review 
1.9.1 What is a Merger? 
Before going into academic definitions of mergers, it is trite to consider the 
definition of this central concept as defined in the Act. In terms of section 42 of the Act, a 
merger is something that occurs through a stock or asset purchase of one firm by another.  
Specifically, „a merger occurs when one or more undertakings directly or indirectly 
acquire or establish direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of 
another undertaking.‟8 In terms of section 1 an undertaking means any business carried 
on for gain or reward by an individual, a body corporate, an unincorporated body of 
persons or a trust in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of 
any service.‟   
A combination of these definitions is very important because it characterises the 
nature of the transaction between Massmart and Wal-Mart which gave rise to the High 
and Supreme Court cases which are dealt with in detail in Chapter 3 below.  
 
1.9.2 Literature on mergers in general 
It is well documented in mainstream competition law literature that these studies 
are driven by an interest to inform competition policy or to understand why so many 
mergers do not fulfil their promises.9 Managers usually claim synergies of various sorts 
                                                 
8 Section 42(1) of the Act. 






as their reason to merge with another company. In as far as such synergies save economic 
resources mergers would not be subject to criticism from a welfare point of view. 
Antitrust concerns aim at the consequences of a merger for market power. At least the 
competition between the merging parties can be expected to diminish or even to 
disappear. Therefore according to Schulz „it can be safely assumed that prices would 
increase for this reason cet. par. and thus welfare would decrease. Of course, for a full 
picture the potential advantages of synergies in costs (the efficiency defence) have to be 
weighed against the danger of increased prices.‟10 
Farrell and Shapiro11 provide an analysis which shows that a merger can only be 
welfare enhancing if it triggers substantial cost reductions. This result can in their 
analysis also be expressed as a function concentration ratio. Under the hypothesis that 
mergers are only achieved if profits rise, this boils down to a threshold value of 
concentration. If the concentration of a merger is below this threshold a merger is welfare 
increasing. 
A seminal work by Elhauge and Geradin12 shows that with markets becoming 
increasingly global, mergers requiring approval in several jurisdictions, and businesses 
expanding their operations across the borders and continents, competition has truly 
become a global phenomenon. This book further shows that competition law is not only 
about law but also about economics and other related disciplines in the social sciences as 
well hence it‟s useful to the study of the strategies of corporations such as Wal-Mart 
which form the crux of this study. The book is useful in so far as it provides a 
comparative analysis of competition law across many jurisdictions in the world hence its 
title. 
Another interesting reading is one by Kolev, Haleblian, and McNamara.13 This 
book provides a useful expose of the development of competition law through the ages. It 
                                                 
10 Ibid. see also Schulz, N. (2003): Wettbewerbspolitik, Mohr Siebeck 
11 J Farrell and C Shapiro Horizontal mergers, American Economic Review, (1990) 80, pp.107-126 
12 E Elhauge and D Geradin Global Competition Law and Economics Hart Publishing. Hart Publications. 
New York.  
1313 K Kolev J Haleblian G McNamara The Handbook of Mergers and Acquisitions. History, Antecedents, 





shows how global corporations have rushed for markets and how that rush has created 
friction leading to them looking for partnerships thus mergers in order to overtake the 
other into taping new markets. This book is very useful in so far as it provides us with a 
general insight on how corporations such as Wal-Mart have come to the point of looking 
for markets in Africa after failures in other markets such as Europe. This again gives us 
insights on the differing cultures of the world and how they affect global competition. 
Ismail, et al14, synthesize and analyse prior literature of mergers and acquisitions 
and its effects on the financial performance in an attempt to determine factors that might 
influence post-mergers and acquisitions performance. The main conclusion of the author 
is that there are inconclusive results among studies on the literature, where, corporate 
performance is improved in some cases but not in others. Although this paper looks at 
both legal and economic perspectives, it sheds light on the economics that be-lay the two 
judgements in the High Court and the Supreme Court of Namibia. The economic factors 
highlighted in this paper are reflected in the general fears expressed in the media in 
Namibia during the period when the Wal-Mart case was being heard in the two courts 
mentioned above. 
 
The media perceptions and the general fears in Namibia are summed up in a 
thought-provoking piece by Jauch who in his article, published in one of Namibia‟s 
leading newspaper said that there are so many reasons why Namibians should be 
concerned by the Wal-Mart merger with Massmart. The author generates fear when he 
says; 
„Wal-Mart's entry into Namibia ... will have similar consequences to those experienced by other 
countries in recent years. The retail giant might offer goods at lower prices and lure consumers 
with slogans such as 'low prices will give people a raise every time they shop with us'. The real 
price, however, will be paid by the workers employed by Wal-Mart and its suppliers. They will be 
confronted with extreme pressures and be forced to accept working conditions that will not allow 
them to meet even their most basic needs. Namibia's former Ramatex workers have experienced 
this first-hand!‟15  
                                                 
14 TH Ismail, AA Abdou and R Magdy Review of Literature Linking Corporate Performance to Mergers 
and Acquisitions The Review of Financial and Accounting Studies, No. 1, 2011 Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335509 Last accessed 23 August 2014.  





According to the author „Wal-Mart's track record clearly indicates that the retail giant is 
not concerned about local development needs and thus it would be naive to believe that 
its behaviour in Namibia and South Africa would be different.‟16 As a recommendation 
the author takes a negative swipe at Wal-Mart and urges: „the time has come to learn 
from history, to become selective when dealing with investments and to implement a 
development strategy that delivers social benefits such as overcoming poverty, meeting 
basic needs and creating decent jobs. Wal-Mart has nothing to offer in this regard.‟17  
    From the above it is reasonable to argue that Wal-Mart may appear as the best 
corporation in providing low priced goods; however its entrance in Namibia like many 
others countries will be no different because the workers are bound to suffer the same 
fate in terms of working conditions and low salaries. Competition law can serve as an 
excellent intermediary to curb some of these abuses by imposing condition to mergers 
when approving them that best fit the circumstances presented and in doing so promote 
development of the local small and medium enterprises which is the tenor of competition 
law. The provision of low prices is no doubt geared towards consumer welfare, however 
this should not be looked at blindly because it is on the basis of low prices and transfer 
pricing through its supply chains that Wal-Mart renders the local small and medium 
enterprises anti-competitive. Although Wal-Mart can justify its entrance in a country‟s 
market on this ground, it also provides a test to the limits of competition law which does 
not only include lower prices but involves factors of public interests which serves as a 
determining factor for justifying its entrance in a particular market or not. 
1.9.3 Literature about Wal-Mart 
There is plenty of literature that gives information about Wal-Mart. Shevel, 
reported that Wal-Mart is the world‟s biggest retailer.18 The author goes on to say that 
this corporation is also the largest private employer and makes sales in excess of three 
billion dollars each week.19 In the Supreme Court of Namibia per O‟Regan AJA, 
                                                 
16 ibid 
17 ibid 
18 Shevel, The Sunday Times, 22 May 2011 






described Wal-Mart in the following terms: “Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated is a company 
incorporated in the state of Arkansas in the United States of America. It is apparently the 
world‟s largest company, in terms of revenue, with annual revenue estimated at US$408 
billion, larger than the gross domestic product of most of the countries in the world.”20  
This resonates well with further statistics by Shevel who further states that Wal-
Mart's sales are equivalent in size to the world‟s 23rd largest economy, Norway, “and 
exceeds the GDP of South Africa.”21  These revenues emanate from the diversified retail 
base of Wal-Mart as it sales food, clothing, tools, electrical, and even cars.22 The 
Competition Appeal Court of South Africa summarised Wal-Mart in similar terms and 
added: 
„It is the largest retailer in the world. Its operations include three retail formats in the form of 
discount stores, super centres which contain products such as bakery goods, meat and dairy 
products, fresh produce, dry goods and staples, beverages, deli food, frozen food, canned and 
packaged goods, condiments and spices, household appliances and apparel and general 
merchandise, and finally neighbourhood markets which sell a variety products that are also offered 
by its super centres. It also owns a chain of warehouse stores called Sam‟s Club which sell 
groceries and general merchandise, often in bulk.‟23 
 
It can be inferred from the above that Wal-Mart is the most successful and richest 
corporation. According to the Trade Intelligence, Wal-Mart Trade Profile Report of 2010 
Wal-Mart, “became the first trillion dollar company in the world”24 The Deputy 
Organising Director for Global Strategies - United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
(UFCW) did not mince his words in expressing how big this corporation is and how rich 
the owners are. In an interview he said:  
„the six members of the Walton family, heirs to the company ... are worth approximately US$ 92 
billion – that‟s ninety two BILLION dollars – BILLION with a “B” – a capital “B”. ... This figure, 
                                                 
20 Namibian Competition Commission and Another v Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated (SA 41/2011) [2011] 
NASC 11 (4 November 2011) para 2. 
21 Shevel op cit. 
22 D.Yoffie Wal-Mart Harvard Business School (2005) 14 April 2005 Harvard Business School  
23 The Minister of Economic Development, the Minister of Trade and Industry, The Minister of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries v The Competition Tribunal, the Competition Commission, Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 
Massmart Holdings Ltd, SACCAWU, SACTWU and SASMMEF case number 110/CAC/Jun11 and 
111/CAC/Jun11 para 5 






based on 2007 statistics, is equal to the combined wealth of about 35 million American families, 
which equates to about 30 percent of the population.‟25 
 
Wal-Mart has had some problems with unions across the world in various 
countries in which it operates and that includes in Namibia. The situation in Namibia and 
the litigation that Wal-Mart was involved in is summarised and analysed in the 
subsequent chapters below this will not be dealt with here. The South African situation 
will also not be dealt with here for it is also considered as a comparative case below. The 
table below is extracted from the South African Wal-Mart Case26 and shows some of the 
unions.  
 
                                                 
25 K Alexander „Challenges and Opportunities: The Wal-Mart Effect In South Africa‟ a Research Report 
Submitted to the Department of Sociology, School of Social Sciences, Faculty Humanities, University of 
the Witwatersrand, In Partial Fulfilment of The Requirements for The Degree of Master Of Sociology By 
Coursework and Research Report 15 February 2012. 
26 South African Wal Mart Case op cit para 132. 
Argentina  
 
Federación Argentina de Empleados de 
Comerio Servicios (FAECYS) 
Brazil  
 




United Food and Commercial Workers 
International Union (UFCW) 
China  
 






Great Britain  
 
GMB: Britain‟s Geneal Union 
Japan)  
 
Federation of Seiyu Workers Union (SWU 
Korea  
 







Given its scale of operations and size, Wal-Mart‟s business operations have been 
the subject of considerable scrutiny and public controversy. The major controversy has 
been evidenced by its disputes with Unions.27 Wal-Mart shuts down plants and stores 
where unionisation rights are won; it hires and fires workers at will, forces the lowest 
echelon of worker to work overtime without pay and is reported to have sexist gender 
policies in which only men are promoted.28 
Further, according to Jauch, „Wal-Mart has a long-standing and well-documented 
history of union-bashing and driving down employment conditions of its staff.‟ 29 The 
author reports that in the US alone, there are 15 rulings against the company by the 
National Labour Relations Board. In Mexico, a Supreme Court ruling compared the Wal-
Mart labour practices to the corrupt and repressive conditions that Mexico had 
experienced under its dictator Parfirio Diaz. 30  
According to Jauch practices such as cutting wages and employment benefits, 
blatant gender discrimination, preventing staff from joining trade unions, dismissing 
union activists and paying staff in coupons (which can only be used in Wal-Mart stores) 
are part of the company's operations. A report released in 2007 by Human Rights Watch 
stated that although Wal-Mart was not the only bad employer, the company „stands out 
for the sheer magnitude and aggressiveness of its anti-union apparatus‟31.•  
 
1.9.4 Specific literature on Wal-Mart in South Africa 
There is a research report by Kelly Alexander from the University of 
Witwatersrand which specifically deals with the effects of Wal-Mart on the South 
African economy. There are some legal aspects dealt within this interesting, useful and 
indeed relevant piece. Specifically the Report is titled: „Challenges and Opportunities: 
                                                 
27 COSATU. (2011-C). Wal-Mart deal not in the best interests of SA. In COSATU Today: COSATU Press 
Statements. http://www.cosatu.org.za/docs/pr/2011/pr0719.html Accessed 14/01/2012.  
28 Wal-Mart Watch Report, 2007-a 







The Wal-Mart Effect In South Africa.‟ This report as summarised in its abstract aimed at 
investigating the potential effect that Wal-Mart will have on labour, the local economy 
and consumers in South Africa. This was done in the broader context of neo-liberal 
globalisation. Albeit briefly the author critically analyses the stakeholders‟ engagement 
around the issues of Wal-Mart‟s arrival and the role of the state, the resistance by local 
and international trade unions, the detrimental effects on the local and informal 
economies, the failure of the South African macro-economic policy environment and the 
positive effect that Wal-Mart will have on consumers. The author finds that: 
„Although Wal-Mart‟s arrival could exacerbate this, it simultaneously provides a springboard for 
resistance and a unique opportunity to rethink the policy framework of the country. In a country 
with high levels of poverty, Wal-Mart may force local retailers to become increasingly 
competitive and to provide goods to consumers at a lower cost which is obviously something that 
will benefit local consumers.‟32 
 
One other key finding by the author was that “Wal-Mart‟s strength is in its 
systems and processes which is something that could benefit South African companies as 
they learn from the giant retailer.”33 As a recommendation therefore the author reiterates 
that Wal-Mart‟s entry into South Africa will have to be carefully managed and monitored 
to ensure the maximum benefit for all stakeholders, and to limit the adverse effects of the 
retail giant.34   
The findings of this seminal report are very important for they can be transplanted 
to Namibia. However some careful transplantation should be taken into consideration 
because the Wal-Mart issue in this paper is taken as a labour issue as opposed to a 
competition issue which later is the case in Namibia. The report remains informative and 
relevant piece as the two countries have similar economic characteristics and share a 
common politico-legal and social history. 
1.9.5 Definition of key terms in this study 
The various definitions of terms that will be used in this study have been 
summarised in table 1 as below. 
 
                                                 
32 K Alexander 2012 op cit p4 








Operational Definition in this study 
Undertaking In this study, undertakings will be used to 
imply the various business activities 
which have an effect on competition. 
Goods In this particular study, good will refer to 
the various commodities that are processes 
by manufacturing companies and 




Competition regulation in this context will 
involve the control of abuse of dominance, 
anti-competitive agreements and anti-
competitive mergers & acquisitions, using 
provisions of competition law. 
Table 1: Table of definition of research terms 
1.10 Division of Study 
The study consists of five chapters. This Chapter has dealt with aspects such 
as the statement of the problem which is to be solved by carrying out in the 
forthcoming chapters, justificatory grounds for conducting this research, the 
methodology that will be employed in finding solutions to the problem and finally 
the research question that will act as a guideline of the issues to be tackled 
throughout the paper. 
Chapter two will provide a micro overview of the Competition Act in 
Namibia; this will include an analysis of the provisions dealing with mergers 
contained in the Act. This chapter will also consist of an analysis of the 
ministerial review procedure in terms of section 49 of the Act and state whether or 
not such procedural step is necessary for the purpose of merger control. 
Chapter three will tackle the problem. This chapter will deal with the analysis 
of the Wal-Mart judgment in the High and Supreme Court of Namibia as well as 





It will further deal with the question of public interest in relation to competition 
law mergers. 
Chapter four will contain an overall analysis and discussion of the effects the 
Namibia judgment in the Wal-Mart case has had on the development of mergers 
(competition law) in Namibia; whether it hinders or enhances such development. 
Chapter five is the final part of the research paper and it will deal with 






General overview of Competition Law in Namibia 
2.1 Introduction 
Competition laws of each country differ and contain some unique elements 
designed to suit the jurisdiction they apply to. However these specific laws may 
have some similarities or may have elements borrowed from other countries 
hence some comparisons may be made based on what was borrowed, what is 
similar and or what is based on international best practices.  
This Chapter provides a general overview of Competition law in Namibia. 
The overview will include an analysis of the provisions dealing with mergers 
contained in the Act. The expose of the salient principles in the Act may 
whenever necessary be done from a comparative perspective especially with the 
South African laws.  
This chapter will also consist of an analysis of the ministerial review 
procedure in terms of section 49 in the Act. This expose will help one understand 
the positions of the courts in the Wal-Mart case analysed in Chapter 3 below. 
Further it will help one understand the answers to the question whether or not 
such procedural step is necessary for the purpose of merger control under the Act 
in Namibia. Ultimately the answers will inform some analysis to the Supreme 
Court judgement and the recommendations made in Chapter 5 below.   
This Chapter will start from the general to the particular. Specifically the 
chapter will consider the Namibian economy first which informs the investment 
and competition laws relevant to this dissertation. It then considers the general 
aspects of competition law and then specifics of Namibian competition laws.  
2.2 The Namibian Economy in perspective 
Namibia is located in the South Western part of the African continent. Its 
land area is 752,614 km2, with a population of 2.2 million people as per Census 
conducted in 2010. It achieved its independence from South Africa in 1990. This 





occupation. Henceforward, the country has been striving to find its footing, and to 
be on the same socio-economic pedestal as its neighbours. The colonial system 
was characterized by racial and ethnic segregation. As such, the Namibian 
economy is one of contrast.  
Generally, Namibia is a small economy characterized by a large and non-
tradable sector, and an export oriented primary sector, fisheries, agriculture and 
mining. Mining is the most important economic contributor, with about 25% of 
the country‟s revenue. 
Namibia‟s economy is closely tied with that of South Africa due to their 
shared history. One of the least populated countries in the world; it enjoys a good 
political, economic and social environment. Agriculture, tourism, and the mining 
industry form the basis of the country‟s economy. As at 2010, its GDP was $ 
16.19 Billion; while its real GDP growth rate was 7%. 
Competition law in Namibia is an integral part of the overall macroeconomic 
policies of Namibia. It does not only complement the development of the white 
paper on industrial policy in 1992 but also supports the export processing zone 
(EPZ) Act 9 of 1995, the enactment of a small and medium enterprises (SME) 
policy in 1996 as well as the drafting of the transformation and Economic and 
social Framework (TESEF) and the foreign investment Act of 27 of 1990.  
 
2.3 Investment and regulatory institutions involved 
Namibia is a country that is highly dependent on Foreign Investment. Great 
effort has therefore been exerted in the direction of making the Namibian 
economy attractive to foreign investment. This is the rational of the Foreign 
Investment Act. The process of regulating competition in Namibia is overseen by 
the Namibian Competition Act35. This particular Act led to the establishment of 
the Namibia Competition Commission (NaCC) which has locale over all financial 
divisions of the nation.  
                                                 
35 Government Gazette, Ministry of Justice, Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority 





Notwithstanding the Commission as a controller, Namibia has a few different 
statutes legislating the regulation of specific divisions. Through these statutes, 
organisations were secured to control these segments including the National Bank 
of Namibia commonly abbreviated as (BoN), the Namibian Financial Institutions 
Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA), the Communication Regulatory Authority of 
Namibia (CRAN) and the Namibia Ports Authority (Namport) are examples of 
such institutions.36 
Area controllers then again are concerned with the specialised and financial 
issues inside and amongst the organisations in their particular divisions. The BoN 
for example directs business banks through the control of least saves to be kept. It 
likewise manages passage into the managing an account area by guaranteeing that 
banks that want to enter the business meet the base capital necessity.  
The Commission manages competition through merger and procurement 
control. It limits the ill-use of strength by firms and different sorts of prohibitive 
business drills. The Commission consequently takes a dynamic part evaluating 
merger and procurement suggestions by firms and supporting just those which are 
not liable to be impeding to competition in the particular markets. It additionally 
guarantees that prohibitive business practices, for example, cartels and 
development are checked and in situations where it is found to exist, the 
organisations mindful are subjected to revenge.  
NAMFISA has specific regulations, for example, that of recommending to 
firms what bit of any arranged financing to put resources into the nearby economy 
before contributing abroad. CRAN has a few regulations set up, for example, 
those relating to the exchange of control, duty of TV licenses, endorsing 
interconnection rates and assignment of range37. Namport is in charge of 
controlling the development of products or travellers inside the ports, managing 
access to the ports and recommending levies for the procurement of port 
administrations.  
                                                 
36 HS Harris & American Bar Association. Competition laws outside the United States (2001) Chicago, I II 
Section of Antitrust Law American Bar Association. 





All these administrative capacities are plainly specialised with the exception 
of where part controllers are given competition capacities. In spite of their 
distinctive targets and the diverse strategies to achieving those goals 
notwithstanding, what competition powers and division controllers have as 
something to be shared is the objective of ensuring and improving social and 
financial welfare. Neither of the two substitutes for the other because there is a 
specific requirement for both.  
2.4 Competition Law in general 
Researchers have noted that most developing countries are faced with 
difficult situations in regards to their plan of strategy. It is worth noting that this is 
not a problem which is selective to competition law in that, hyper globalisation 
and its impetus of developing countries into straight coat model of the worldwide 
economy have a tendency to influence the power of the country state. Thus, this 
confines the extent of national self-sufficiency in the plan and execution of 
financial and social strategy and correspondingly affecting on the impact of 
majority rule government over the developing of the national financial course as 
observed by Fishman38. 
Before venturing into the specifics of Namibian competition law in detail, it 
is important to share the reasons for the need of competition law in the first place, 
as highlighted in the table below39. 
 
                                                 
38 C Fishman. The Wal-Mart effect: How the world’s most powerful company really Works 
and how it's transdeveloping the American economy (2006) New York The Penguin Press. 
39 A Kumar2006 „Relationship between Competition Authority and Sectoral Regulator‟ Presentation made 
at SAFIR Workshop, Lahore, 25-26 March 2006 Available at http://www.competition-commission-






Figure 1: Importance of Competition Law 
 
 In developing countries like Namibia, financial development is essential for 
financial and social development including through competition law. In South 
Africa, the enactment looked to present indigenous contemplations. The South 
African Competition Act incorporates an open investment provision which, 
contingent on the certainties, may trump customary competition contemplations. 
This procurement takes after s2 of the Act which sets out the goals and conditions 
separated from customary contemplations of value, amount and buyer decision 
this confers the Act to push small and medium size South African business and 
also vocation and territorial development40  
In some of the most recent analysis of competition law in developing 
countries, researchers have recommended that South Africa  resisted limitations 
that influence, for instance, its kindred African countries, is in a more good 
position to protect itself against world restrictions as a result of its more created 
economy and vital essentialness as an entryway to the mainland.  
2.5 The Namibian Competition Act 3 of 2003 
For a developing country such as Namibia, competition law is important in 
increasing competitive markets, increasing firm level efficiency and international 
                                                 





competitiveness. 41 To this end the Competition Act was passed. This part will 
now consider this Act in general. Some specific aspects will be covered in the 
proceeding sections. 
2.5.1 General 
Competition law in Namibia is an integral part of the overall macroeconomic 
policies of Namibia. For a developing country such as Namibia, competition law 
is important in increasing competitive markets, increasing firm level efficiency 
and international competitiveness. 42 
Competition law in Namibia forms a significant part of economic reforms 
aimed at addressing the countries historical structure and the enhancement of 
broad based economic growth and development. The task of promoting 
competitive market conditions through investigations, prosecution of anti-
competitive activities, review and approval of merger and exemption applications, 
rests in the Namibian Competition Commission (NaCC), which is created by the 
state for the implementation of the Competition Act 2 of 2003. 
Like any other competition law, Namibia‟s competition law also covers the 
three major areas of competition namely, anti- competitive behaviour and 
agreements, anti-competitive mergers and abuse of dominance. The Competition 
Act of Namibia also includes provisions of public interest on protecting 
consumers by safeguarding competitive prices and product choices, promoting 
employment and advancing the social and economic welfare of Namibians. 
Another feature peculiar to the Namibia‟s competition law is the special 
requirements of its economy such as the protection and promotion of small 
undertakings and promoting the greater spread of ownership to previously 
disadvantaged people.   
                                                 
41 B Dundee, „Are merger conditions a viable instrument to achieve non-economic goals in developing 
countries‟ (2012) www.comp.co.za 
42 B Dundee Article: Are merger conditions a viable instrument to achieve non-economic goals in 





However it must be stated that the Namibia Competition Act shows 
particular similarity with the South African Competition Act 98 of 1998 in the 
inclusion of public interest objectives as part of the assessment of competition 
issues. The discretionary component for determining whether a merger is required 
for non- economic objectives is under the authority of the independent Namibia 
Competition Commission. 
2.5.2 Historical Background on Competition Law in Namibia 
Before Namibia gained independence in 1990, issues of competition concern 
was regulated by the Regulations of Monopolistic Conditions Amendment Act 14 
of 1958. After independence, this law ceased to apply in Namibia.  The Namibian 
Government, aided by the European Union commissioned a study leading to the 
drafting of a Competition Bill in 1996.43 
The government soon after established the steering Advisory Committee on 
competition tasked to discuss the Bill with all stakeholders44. The resultant 
Competition Act was signed by the president of the Republic of Namibia on 3rd 
April 2003. However the Act only came in to operation on 3rd March 2008 
following the determination of the Minister of Trade and Industry and by the 
publication of a notice in the Government Gazette in terms of s70 (1) of the Act.  
It is through the inception of the Competition Act in the country that saw the 
regulation of competition law issues officially become a reality in Namibia as an 
independent nation. This is a reflection of the governments continued 
commitment in ensuring a fair and competitive trading environment in the 
economy.  
The task of promoting competitive market conditions through investigations, 
prosecution of anti-competitive activities, review and approval of mergers and 
exemption applications, rests in the NaCC, which is created by the state for the 
implementation of the Act. This requires tremendous handwork, commitment and 
dedication from the NaCC as it faces daunting challenges in its task to enforce 
                                                 
43 Government Gazette, Ministry of Justice, Namport Act, 2 of 1994 





this piece of legislation and the Wal-Mart case which forms the crux of this 
dissertation is one such indicator of the challenges facing the nation. 
2.5.3 Salient features of the Act 
As noted above the Act resembles in many aspects the South African 
competition law which was passed in 1998, as the inspirations flowed from the 
models and patterns of the latter45 
The Act consists of a combination of efficiency objectives and retributive 
objectives as applied in s47 (d)-(h) of the Act. The first set of objectives is pure 
competition policy objectives and the second are pure industrial policy objectives. 
Further the Act covers all economic activity in Namibia. The overall purpose of 
the Competition Act is to promote and maintain competition. Section 2 of the Act 
provides that the purpose of the Competition Act is to enhance the promotion and 
safeguarding of competition in Namibia in order to: 
(a) Promote  efficiency, adaptability and development of the Namibian 
economy; 
(b) Provide consumers with competitive process and product choices; 
(c) Promote employment and advance social and economic welfare of 
Namibians; 
(d) Expand opportunities for Namibian participation in the world markets 
whilst recognizing the role of foreign competition in Namibia ; 
(e) Ensuring that small undertakings have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the Namibian economy; and 
(f) Promote greater spread of ownership stakes of historically 
disadvantaged persons. 
There exists an implied purpose of the Act in terms of the prohibition of anti-
competitive practices and abuse of dominance as these two prohibitions are not 
enumerated in s2 of the Act. Moreover, the Act is applicable to all economic 
activities within Namibia or having an effect in Namibia. Thus, it is the nature of 






the economic activity concerned and not the status of the operation of the form of 
intervention that indicates how competition rules apply. The Act bind the state 
insofar as the state is engaged in trade or business for the production, supply or 
distribution of goods or the provision of any service, but the state is not subject to 
criminal liability.  
The Act also applies to activities of statutory bodies, except insofar as those 
activities are authorized by any law.46 The Competition Act does not define 
“economic activity” and there is currently no precedent on how this phrase should 
be interpreted47. Furthermore, s4 of the Act provides that the jurisdiction of the 
NaCC only extends to the borders of Namibia and not beyond, subject only to the 
Constitution of the Republic and the law. 
In addition, competition law is aimed at encouraging the process of 
competition in order to promote the efficient use of resources while protecting the 
freedom and economic action of various market players48. 
2.5.4 The regulation and control of Mergers under the Act 
Below is a consideration of the current law and provisions that regulate 
mergers/acquisitions in Namibia in light of the Competition Act 3 of 2003. A case 
study will be done in the following chapter on how this law applies and how 
strong or weak it is considering the judgments of the High Court and Supreme 
Court in the case of Wal-Mart//Massmart Holdings Wal-Mart Stores Inc v 
Chairperson of The Namibian Competition Commission And Others49 which is 
the only prominent Namibian case that has ever dealt with the issue of mergers. 
The NaCC has made significant progress in fulfilling its mandate over the 
past two years, particularly in the field of merger control. One of the main 
challenges faced by business wanting to expand operations through Africa is 
monitoring and complying with various competition law developments which are 
                                                 
46 See section 3(3) of the Act. 
47 Ibid. 
48 UNTAD, 2009 op cit.  





taking place in a number of jurisdictions50, Namibia is no exception. The NaCC 
has already reviewed 200 mergers in a variety of sectors since it was established, 
including mining, banking and finance, cementious products, retail and hardware 
sectors51.  
As under the South African competition law regime, the Namibian Act also 
contains merger regulation provisions. The terms merger and acquisitions refers 
to the aspect of corporate finance strategy and management dealing with the 
merging and acquiring of different companies as well as assets52. Even though 
sometimes these terms are often used in a synonymous fashion, they slightly 
mean different things. An acquisition or takeover is the buying of one company 
by another, this entails the purchasing of a smaller company by a larger firm.  
On the other hand a merger happens when two firms agree to go forward as a 
single new company rather than remaining a separately owned and operated 
company53. For the purposes of the Competition Act of Namibia mergers and 
acquisitions are called „mergers‟, as the term „mergers‟ is used in a broad sense 
covering combinations of enterprises in various forms.  
Chapter 4 of the Act deals with the concept of mergers, regulation and 
control. In terms of s42 (1) of the Act a merger is defined as follows: “a merger 
occurs when one or more undertakings directly or indirectly acquire or establish 
direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of another 
undertaking”. In addition s42 (2) provides that a merger may be achieved in any 
manner including: 
(a) A purchase or lease of shares, an interest, or assets of the other 
undertaking in question: or 
(b) Amalgamation or other combination with the other undertaking. 
                                                 
50 H Jauch. „The Wal-Mart take-over, many reasons to be concerned.‟  The Namibian, 9 August 2011. 
51  N Rose Antitrust, Competition and Regulatory Bulletin, (2013). Norton Rose  
52  Based on definitions from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/mergers as 






Moreover, s42 (3) defines the control of mergers and owing to the wording of 
the section, a person controls an undertaking if that person: 
(a) beneficially owns more than one half of the issued share capital of the 
undertaking:  
(b) he is entitled to vote a majority of the votes that may be cast at a 
general meeting of the ability to control the voting of a majority of 
those votes, either directly or through a controlled entity of that 
undertaking; 
(c) is able to appoint or to veto appointment, of a majority of the 
directors of the undertaking; 
(d)  is a holding company, and the undertaking is a subsidiary of that 
company as contemplated in the Companies Act 61 of 1973; 
(e) in the case of an undertaking being a trust, has the ability to control 
the majority of the votes of the trustees or to appoint the majority of 
the trustees or to appoint or change the majority of the beneficiaries 
of the trust; 
(f) in the case of the undertaking being a close corporation, owns the 
majority of the members interests or controls directly or has the right 
to control the majority of the members interests or control directly or 
has the right to control the majority of members votes in the close 
corporation; or 
(g)   any benefits likely to be derived 
(h)  any benefits likely to be derived from the proposed merger relating to 
research and development, technical efficiency, increased production, 
efficient distribution of goods or provision of services and access to 
markets. 
(i)  From the proposed merger relating to research and development, 
technical efficiency, increased production, efficient distribution of 






Section 45 of the Act provides that, the NaCC is required to consider and 
make a determination in relation to a proposed merger within thirty days after the 
date on which it receives the merger notification. The merger examination period 
may however be extended if the NaCC requires further information for its 
examination, or if a conference is required in relation to the proposed merger. In 
making a determination in relation to a proposed merger the NaCC may in terms 
of s47 (1) of the Act either:  
a) give approval for the implementation of the merger; or  
b) decline to give approval for the implementation of the merger.  
  
The NaCC can also approve mergers with certain conditions aimed at 
alleviating or lessening the identified competition concerns in the transaction, or 
increase the transactions public interest benefits. The Commission uses first, the 
substantive test in the examination of mergers considering the prevention of 
lessening competition in the relevant market or the restriction of trade or 
provisions of any service, or the endangering of the continuity of supplies or 
services in Namibia.  
Secondly the NaCC may prohibit a notified concentration if it is to be 
expected that it creates or strengthen a dominant position unless the undertaking 
concerned provide evidence that the concentration will lead to an improvement of 
the conditions of competition on the markets as stipulated in 47 (b). Thirdly 
public interests considerations in merger examination are also provided for in the 
Act.  
2.6 The Ministerial Review process 
The Minister of Trade and Industry can in terms of s49 of the Act review the 
NaCC‟s decision on a merger, on application by the party to the merger. Section 
49 stipulates the following: (1) Not later than 30 days after notice is given by the 
Commission in the Gazette in terms of s47(7) of the determination made by the 





application to the Minister, in the form determined by the Minister, to review the 
NaCC‟s decision.  
Subsection (2) (a) requires the Minister to publish by notice in the Gazette 
within 3 days after receiving an application in terms of subsection (1), giving 
notice of the application for a review; and (b) invite interested parties to make 
submissions to the Minister in regard to any matter to be reviewed within the time 
and manner stipulated in the notice. Subsection (3) states that within 4 months 
after the date that an application for review was made, the Minister must make a 
determination either:  
a) overturning the decision of the Commission;  
b) amending the decision of the Commission by ordering restrictions or 
including conditions; or  
c) confirming the decision of the Commission. 
 
The Minister must give notice of the determination made by the him in 
relation to the review to the NaCC and to the parties involved in the proposed 
merger, in writing; and by notice in the Gazette; as well as issue written reasons 
for that determination to the Commission and the parties involved54.The Minister 
may determine the procedure for a review in terms of this section55 
Two applications for the Minister‟s review of NaCC‟s decision on mergers 
were made since its inception. Both applications involved the Commission‟s 
conditional approval of the transactions. One was the Wal-Mart Store/Mass 
Holdings merger. As an administrative decision making body, the NaCC, in the 
exercise of its functions, must comply with the principles of administrative justice 
which advocates for the duty to act reasonably and fairly and for the provision of 
reasons for making a decision.56 
                                                 
54 Sections 49(4) (a) (i) and (ii) of the Act. 
55 Section 49 (5) of the Act.  





The control and merger regulation provisions apply to every proposed merger, 
unless they fall within a class which the Minister of Trade and Industry with the 
concurrence of the NaCC has determined to exclude from the merger provisions 
of the Namibia Competition Act57. For almost five years and until recently, the 
Minister has failed to publish such notice. Therefore no financial thresholds for 
compulsory merger notifications in Namibia had been prescribed, resulting in all 
mergers within and involving Namibian entities, or those which had an effect 
within Namibia, having to be notified to the NaCC58. 
However, on 24th of December 2012, the thresholds were finally published59.  
The following is to be notified to the NaCC;  
a) The targets turnover or assets in Namibia must exceed 10 million 
Namibian dollars and; 
b) The combination turnover or assets of the target and acquiring of firms 
must exceed 20 million Namibian dollars. 
Both thresholds must be met for mandatory notification and a merger may 
not be implemented in Namibia until it has been approved by the Competition 
Commission in terms of the Act. This process can take more than three months to 
complete, or even longer if reviews and appeals are launched. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided a general overview of Competition law in 
Namibia.  It showed the Namibian economy as generally a small economy then 
considered the general aspects of competition law and then specifics of Namibian 
competition laws. The general purpose of the chapter was to put the reader in 
perspective in regards to the country and the major law that applies to the issues 
addressed in this dissertation. To this end the Chapter also had to mention some 
comparable laws such as the Competition Act of South Africa. 
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Relevant to the Wal-Mart case this Chapter also provided an overview of the 
ministerial review procedure in terms of section 49 of the Act. In order to help 
one understand the answers to the question whether or not such procedural step is 









Case Study: Wal-Mart//Massmart Case in Namibia 
3.1 Introduction 
As noted above the concept of mergers has gained serious attention and 
momentum in Namibia over the past three years since the inception and the saga 
that was fuelled by the merger/takeover of the multi-million dollar company Wal-
Mart of some of its supply chain companies in Namibia. The Wal-Mart case in 
Namibia left such a great significant legal precedent regarding mergers, the role 
and importance of competition law and the Competition Commission of Namibia 
(NaCC) in its endeavour to implement and enforce the competition law in the 
Republic. 
This chapter analyses the Wal-Mart case in Namibia. It also has a section on 
some comparative cases in South Africa. Specifically the Chapter has three major 
parts: the first part will deal with the analysis of the Wal-Mart judgment in the 
High and Supreme Court of Namibia. The second part will contain an analysis of 
the Wal-Mart judgment by the South African courts. The third part gives a general 
expose of the role of public interest in relation to competition law and mergers. 
3.2 Factual background to the Wal-Mart case in Namibia 
In November 2010, the Namibian Competition Commission received notification 
of the proposed acquisition of Massmart Holdings Limited in terms of s44 (1)60 of the 
Act. The proposed acquisition included its subsidiary in Namibia, Massmart. In essence, 
the proposed transaction would result in the acquisition of sole control over the Massmart 
                                                 
60 This section provides as follows: 
„Notice to be given to Commission of proposed merger  
    (1) Where a merger is proposed each of the undertakings involved must notify the 
Commission of the proposal in the prescribed manner.  
    (2) If, after receipt of a notification in terms of subsection (1), the Commission is of the 
opinion that in order to consider the proposed merger it requires further information, it 
may, within 30 days of the date of receipt of the notification, request such further 





by Wal-Mart, or wholly owned entity controlled by it. More particularly, the proposed 
merger comprised a firm intention by Wal-Mart to offer to acquire 51% of the ordinary 
share capital in the Massmart by way of a scheme of arrangement.  
It would follow that the change of ownership and control pursuant to the proposed 
merger would occur at the ultimate holding company level in South Africa.  The 
ownership structure of the fourth respondent‟s Namibian entities would not immediately 
change except for the substitution of the applicant for the fourth respondent as an ultimate 
(and indirect) holding company of the Namibian entities. The transaction was clearly a 
merger as defined in terms of s42 of the Act, as explained above and was, thus, notifiable 
to the Commission. 
At the time the merger transaction straddled fourteen different countries.  It 
entailed applications to five national competition regulators and had been approved in 
Tanzania, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia. It was at the time the subject matter of a 
pending procedure before the South African Competition Tribunal was on going, a case 
that will be analysed below as well.  
It was not disputed that there would be no competitive overlap between the 
activities of the two merging parties within Namibia and thus no accretion in market 
shares and no increased concentration in any market in Namibia as a consequence of the 
merger. Wal-Mart accordingly contended that there would be no public interest concerns 
and that the applicant foresees that it would be able to create „significant incremental 
value‟ in the fourth respondent‟s business operations in Namibia.  
Further Wal-Mart and Massmart submitted that the proposed transaction would 
have no negative effect on employment as there would be no job losses, redundancies or 
retrenchments, following the implementation of the merger, but made no binding 
commitments to that effect. In addition, competitors61 in the relevant market did not 
express any concerns over the transaction. 
 
                                                 






3.3 The Commission’s determination 
The Commission‟s evaluation of the proposed transaction found that since 
Wal-Mart had no operations in Namibia at the time, there was no competitive 
overlap between the activities of the merging parties. Therefore the Commission 
by way of a letter dated 9 February 2011 through its Chairperson informed the 
merging parties that it had approved the proposed merger subject to four 
conditions. The merger was approved with the following conditions:  
a) „the merger should allow for local participation in accordance 
with section 2(f) of the Competition Act, 2003.  
b) that there should be no employment losses as a result of the 
merger.  
c) that the merger should not create harmful effects on competition 
that may give rise to risk of the market becoming foreclosed to 
competitors, especially for small and medium enterprises 
(SME‟S).  
d) finally, the approval of the Minister of Trade and Industry is 
required in terms of section 3(4) of the Foreign Investment Act 
no 27 of 1990, since the transaction was a retail business 
transaction‟62. 
                                                 
62Wall mart//Massmart holdings Wal-Mart stores Inc v Chairperson of the Namibian Competition 
Commission and others (A 61/2011)[2011] NAHC 126 (28 April 2011) section 3(4) of the Foreign 
Investment Act provides as follows: 
3(4) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette , specify any business or category of 
business which, in the Minister's opinion, is engaged primarily in the provision of 
services or the production of goods which can be provided or produced adequately by 
Namibians, and, with effect from the date of such notice, no foreign national shall, 
subject to the provisions of section 7(3), through the investment of foreign assets, become 
engaged in or be permitted to become engaged in any business so specified or falling 
within any category of business so specified.  
    (5) Any law relating to natural resources or any licence or other authorisation granted 





This was done in the form of a notice of determination contemplated 
by Form 41 of the Act (Notice 75).  In the notice of determination, the NaCC 
not only set out its conditions in paragraph 3, but also in paragraph 4 
provided the reasons for the imposition of the conditions, as it is required by 
the Act to do so.63 
 
3.4 Concerns of interest groups 
Interest groups in wholesale industry were not happy about this approval 
though there were conditions to it thus; they submitted their concerns about the 
opening of Wal-Mart in Namibia. They communicated that this merger would 
likely price smaller undertakings out of the market. Further their concerns were 
levelled in terms of the growing retail and wholesale industry that would be 
closed down, consequently leading to thousands of Namibians being retrenched in 
the near future.  
To assist these businesses and any potential suppliers who would be 
interested in supplying goods and services to the merged entity, they suggested 
that the merging parties could consider putting in place a supply development 
fund to develop a local supply chain for their operations in Namibia. To this end, 
no specific information has been provided regarding the operation mechanism or 
                                                                                                                                                 
the granting or enjoyment of such rights to or by Namibians on terms more favourable 
than those applicable to foreign nationals.  
 
63 The reasons for the conditions were the following: 
 Commission has regards to the purpose of the Competition Act, 2003, and would like to encourage 
for the attainment of the objectives of the Act, especially, to give effect to section 2(f) of the Act 
(sic). 
 In most instances, mergers results in some workers losing their jobs. Commission encourages that 
retrenchments relating to this transaction be minimized so as not exacerbate the already 
unacceptable unemployment situation in the country. 
 The merger should not affect negatively the ability of small undertakings in Namibia to compete 





logistics as to how the fund will be operated, regulated and managed or what its 
targets were. 
 
3.5 Driving towards litigation: Contestations and further developments 
Wal-Mart contended that all four conditions are unauthorised by law and are 
invalid and also contended that Notice 75 under which the fourth bulleted condition was 
made, is likewise unauthorised and invalid. Following the receipt of the determination, 
Wal-Mart submitted a request in terms of s4964 of the Act to the Minister asking the 
Minister to review the Commission‟s decision to approve the merger subject to the 
conditions on an urgent basis and to determine that the conditions are unenforceable and 
should be deleted. 
Wal-Mart also noted that the conditions had not been canvassed with the merging 
parties before they were imposed and asserted that if the merging parties had been given 
an opportunity to respond to the proposed conditions, they would have pointed out that 
the vague terms of the conditions would lead to difficulties that should be avoided. 
Wal-Mart further requested the Minister to proceed with the review on an urgent 
basis and to deal with the matter within 10 (ten) days and by 18 March 2011.  The 
urgency was requested because approval was expected by the South African Competition 
Tribunal on or around 8 April 2011. (This informs why the South African case is relevant 
to this dissertation. According to Wal-Mart once that approval had been obtained, the 
merging parties would then be entitled to implement the merger at the holding company 
level. This would indirectly affect the control of the fourth respondent‟s Namibian 
subsidiaries. In this sense it would accordingly be necessary to avoid any breach of 
Namibian laws by having the review resolved in advance of the merger.65   
                                                 
64 In terms of ss (1) of this section „[n]ot later than 30 days after notice is given by the Commission in the 
Gazette in terms of section 47(7) of the determination made by the Commission in relation to a proposed 
merger, a party to the merger may make application to the Minister, in the form determined by the Minister, 
to review the Commission's decision.‟   





In response, the Minister considered himself unable to accede to this request by 
18 March 2011. Wal-Mart was aggrieved. This was against the expectations of Wal-Mart 
thus they found a reason to approach the High Court on an urgent basis. 
 
3.6 The litigation 
3.6.1 Preliminary reflections 
After the Minister refused or found himself unable to accede to the requests by 
Wal-Mart, the latter then approached the High Court on an urgent basis for an order 
declaring Notice 75  to be unauthorised by law and invalid and declaring the four 
conditions imposed by the Commission to be invalid. The Chairperson of the 
Commission did not oppose the proceedings but deposed to an affidavit on behalf of the 
Commission.  The Minister opposed the relief sought. 
There were various preliminary issues regarding the urgency of the matter and 
exhaustion of internal remedies which the High Court dealt with at length. They are not 
so important to this dissertation save to say that The High Court pronounced itself first, 
on the issue of exhausting the internal remedies provided for in terms of s49 of the Act. 
Section 49 of the Act prescribes the ministerial review procedure before seeking an order 
that the conditions imposed when a merger is approved be invalid. The High Court ruled 
that Wal-Mart should have exhausted the s49 ministerial review procedures before 
seeking an order that the conditions imposed when the merger was approved were 
invalid. It accordingly ruled that the ministerial review should have preceded the 
application to the court. 
3.6.2 On the merits 
On consideration of the merits the High Court found that Notice 75 was invalid on 
two grounds: first, that in paragraph (a) of the Notice, the Minister conferred upon 
himself the power to permit foreign nationals to engage in the retail industry, a 
„dispensing‟ power that was ultra vires the powers granted to him by section 3(4)66 of the 
                                                 
66 The Foreign Investment Act 27 of 1990 s (3) (3). This section provides: 
No foreign national engaged in business activity or intending to commence a business activity in 





Foreign Investment Act. Secondly, that the retail industry is not an industry engaged „in 
the provision of services or the production of goods‟ within the meaning of section 3(4) 
of the Act which are the only industries in respect of which the Minister may issue a 
notice.   
The Court added that, in any event, the proposed merger did not fall within the 
prohibition of Notice 75, as in purchasing the shares in Massmart; Wal-Mart did not 
„become engaged in businesses‟ within the meaning of the prohibition.  The High Court 
also noted that because paragraph (a) of Notice 75 was invalid, the fourth condition 
imposed by the Commission was also invalid, in that it required Wal-Mart to obtain the 
permission of the Minister to engage in the retail business. 
The High Court then considered the validity of the other three conditions imposed 
by the Commission. It declared each of them to be invalid.  It held that the first condition 
which required the merger to „allow for local participation in accordance with section 2(f) 
of the Act‟ was in conflict with section 3(3) of the Foreign Investment Act, which 
provides that no foreign national „shall be required to provide for the participation of the 
Government or any Namibian as shareholder or as partner in such business, or for the 
transfer of such business to the Government or any Namibian‟.  The Court held in 
addition that the condition was arbitrary and vague in its formulation.  It also noted that 
because the merging parties have not been given notice of the Commission‟s intention to 
impose the condition, the fairness of the procedure followed by the Commission was 
flawed. 
The High Court ruled that where the need existed for a condition to be imposed,  
prior notification of the intention to do so is a requisite, on the basis that the 
omission constituted a procedural defect which impacted on the fairness of the 
procedure followed by the Commission. In terms of the vagueness of the condition, 
                                                                                                                                                 
shareholder or as a partner in such a business or for the transfer of such business to the 
government or any Namibian. Provided that it may be a condition of any license or other 
authorization to or any agreement with foreign national for the grant of rights over natural 
resources that the government shall be entitled to or may acquire an interest in any enterprise to be 





the court ruled that the Commission should define when and how the condition 
should be met, as well as establish a reasonable apprehension before requiring 
rectification thereof can be approved67.  To this the High Court said: 
„There is however further difficulty in this regard and that relates to the failure on 
the part of the Commission to notify the merging parties of the intention to impose 
such a condition.  By failing to do so, the fairness of the procedure followed by the 
Commission is flawed.‟68   
 
The court mentioned that this condition was also rightly challenged because of the 
vague and uncertain terms in which it has been cast.  It did not specify when and 
how the conditions should be met.69 In the opinion of the Court and relying on the 
case of Van Eck NO and Van Rensburg NO v Etna Stores,70 the court concluded that 
the conditions imposed would need to relate to the competitive outcome of the 
proposed merger.71 
With regard to the second condition, that the merger should not result in job 
losses, it held that there was no rational connection between the reason given for the 
condition and the terms of the condition and that it was accordingly invalid. 
According to the court, the reason did not remotely rationally relate to the absolute 
prohibition provided in the condition. The High Court concluded thus that the 
condition is hopelessly unsustainable and it is unsurprising that the Commission had 
not placed any argument or material before the Court to support this (and the other 
conditions).72  
With regard to the third condition, that the merger should not create harmful 
effects on small and medium enterprises especially, the Court held that the condition 
was again not rationally related to the reasons given for it.  The Court also held that 
the terms of the condition were impermissibly vague. 
                                                 
67 B Dundee. (2012) op cit. 
68 Para 14 
69 Para 50 
70 1947(2) SA 984 
71see also the case of University of Cape Town v the Ministers of Education and Culture 1988(3) SA 203 
(C) 





The significance of the High Court Ruling on this issue is that the 
Commission had no power to impose the first condition and that the condition is 
not conferred by s2 (f) of the Act. A closer look at the section gives the 
impression that the section itself does not contain such power, but merely an 
express reference to the purpose sought to be attained.73  
The High Court accordingly declared both Notice 75 and the four conditions 
imposed by the Commission in respect of its approval of the proposed merger to 
be invalid.   
3.7 Supreme Court Judgment - Namibia 
The Commission and the Minister were not happy with the judgment, so they 
both noted appeals against the judgment and orders of the High Court.  After the 
appeals had been noted, Wal-Mart undertook to arrange the preparation of the 
appeal record in order to ensure the matter be dealt with expeditiously.  
3.7.1 Preliminary and procedural aspects  
There were two issues on appeal emanating from the High Court‟s decision: 
the first concerned the validity of Notice 75, and the second concerned the 
validity of the four conditions imposed by the Competition Commission. The 
Supreme Court‟s judgment first dealt with the validity of Notice 75, which this 
dissertation will not delve into detail, as the court of appeal confirmed the order of 
invalidity of the notice made by the High Court on the basis that the Notice 75 is 
ultra vires in terms of its empowering section. Specifically the Court said: 
„For all the above reasons, it seems to me that the phrase “provision of services” in 
section 3(4) of the Foreign Investment Act cannot be interpreted as the appellants 
suggest to include any business that supplies the needs of others, including retail 
businesses. The “provision of services” therefore does not include within its scope 
those businesses that are engaged in the business of selling goods as opposed to 
rendering services.  Accordingly, paragraph (a) of Notice 75 is ultra vires the terms 
of its empowering section, and the order of invalidity made by the High Court in 
this regard must stand. In the light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to consider 
the other bases upon which Wal-Mart argued that Notice 75 was invalid.‟ 
 
This meant that the merger remains in place and the question that remained 
for determination was the validity of the conditions imposed to the merger. 






Secondly before considering whether the conditions imposed by the 
Commission were invalid, the court considered the question of ministerial review 
contemplated in s49 of the Act that has not run its course.  On this note the court 
considered whether the High Court was correct in finding that Wal-Mart could 
seek to have the conditions imposed by the Commission set aside without first 
letting the ministerial review provided for in s49, which Wal-Mart itself had 
instituted, run its course?  The court stated that, the requirement that the internal 
remedy provide effective redress is one that has been acknowledged by South 
African courts as well.74   
According to the Supreme Court determining whether an internal remedy 
provides effective redress requires a careful examination of the remedy provided 
in the statute in the light of the relief sought in the litigation.  Here, the relevant 
relief sought is a declaration that the four conditions imposed by the Commission 
on its approval of the merger were invalid.75 The nature of this relief would be 
relevant in determining whether Wal-Mart should have exhausted the ministerial 
review process before approaching the High Court. 
It went on to say that the three conditions sought to address one or other of 
the statutory purposes set out in s2 and s47 of the Act.  The first condition 
addresses the goal set out in s2 (f) of the Act, the second, the goal set out in s2(c), 
and the considerations identified in s47 (2) (e); and the third, the goal in s2 (e) and 
the considerations in s47 (2) (f).   
According to the court all relevant factors it considered suggest that the 
ministerial review process will often provide effective relief, and relief more 
extensive than that which a reviewing court may provide. Accordingly, a court 
will rarely permit a party to approach it for relief before the review contemplated 
in section 49 is completed.   
                                                 
74 See, for example, Nichol and Another v Registrar of Pension Funds and Others, cited above n 17, at para 
18; the discussion in LG Baxter Administrative Law (1984) Juta at p721 and the references cited there; and 
the discussion in J Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) Juta at p478 - 482. 





The court emphasized that the question in each case will be whether the 
review process will provide effective relief.  To answer this question the courts 
mentioned two situations: The first will arise where the nub of the complaint 
raised goes to „the manner in which the balance between the competing concerns 
set out in section 2 and 47(2) of the Act has been struck by the Commission.‟76 
The task of balancing the competing interests in the Act is not a task for which a 
court has any special competence or one that in the scheme of the Act is assigned 
to a court. To this end:  
„It is a task reserved by the legislation first for the Commission and then for the 
Minister.  Moreover, the Act confers the power upon the Minister to overturn or 
vary the decision of the Commission, a power that will not ordinarily be exercised 
by a court. In the circumstances, where the complaint raises the manner in which 
the considerations mentioned in section 2 and section 47(7) of the Act have been 
balanced in the decision, a court will require the ministerial review process to be 
exhausted before it will consider an application for relief.‟77   
Secondly, a court will rarely permit a party to approach it for relief where the 
complaint is one that the Minister is empowered to resolve during the ministerial 
review process.  The court thus emphasized: „the Act affords the Minister ample 
powers to alter the decision taken by the Commission in the light of the 
information placed before the Minister and ordinarily a court will require that the 
review process run its course.‟ 
The court emphasised further that, whether the conditions formulated by the 
Commission promote these concerns in a rational and appropriate fashion is a 
question, in the first place, for the Minister.  It is for the Minister to decide how 
the competing purposes identified in the Act should best be achieved. The 
decision of the Minister can however be reviewed and if the complaint does not 
relate to the manner in which the balancing exercise has been struck or one that 
the ministerial review cannot correct, then it may be an issue that a court will 
entertain before the review process is complete.  The question in each case will be 
                                                 






whether the ministerial review process provides effective relief to the litigant. 
Thus on this point the court said: 
„One of the considerations as to whether the ministerial review is an effective 
remedy relates to the time that the ministerial review process will take.  In this 
regard, it should be noted that the time periods set out in section 49 of the Act are 
maxima, not minima.  The Minister must publish notice of the review in the Gazette 
within 30 days of receiving the review application. He may of course do it in a 
shorter period. Similarly, the Minister must determine the review within four 
months of the application having been lodged, but he may determine the review 
more quickly.  Moreover, it is the Minister who determines the time limits within 
which interested parties must lodge their comments. These time limits are not set in 
the Act. In determining the appropriate time limit in each case, the Minister will 
take into account the statutory requirement that the review be determined within 
four months of the review application having been lodged, but also other 
considerations, including the question whether the relevant merger is one that 
requires an expeditious decision.‟ 
 
Given this determination, the court did not see it trite to consider the fourth 
condition on the merits thus continued to pronounce itself on the remaining three 
conditions as challenged by Wal-Mart. 
 
3.7.2 On the merits    
The court then considered the challenge to the merits of the case and further 
opined that there may be merit in the claims of Wal-Mart, that the conditions are 
not as precisely formulated as they should be, or not closely connected to the 
reasons provided by the NaCC. However the court noted that it is only the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and not the courts that has to decide whether or 
not the conditions imposed by the NaCC are irrational, vague and or 
unconstitutional.  
On the merits Wal-Mart had argued that the first condition that the merger 
allows for local participation in accordance with section 2(f) of the Act was 
unlawful on the ground that it was in conflict with section 3(3) of the Foreign 





it was vague, arbitrary and irrational.78  The Commission responded that section 
2(f) of the Act which provides that one of the purposes of the Act is “to promote a 
greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase ownership stakes of 
historically disadvantaged persons” authorises the terms of the condition.   
Further Wal-Mart had challenged the second condition, which required that 
there be no employment losses as a result of the merger, on the ground that it was 
irrational and disproportionate.  It also challenged the third condition, that there 
should be no harmful effects on competition, on the basis that it was irrational, 
vague and ultra vires the powers of the NaCC. 
 
For the Supreme Court it was clear that these three conditions seek to address one or 
other of the statutory purposes set out in section 2 and section 47.  The court said 
that the first condition addresses the goal set out in section 2(f) of the Act, the 
second, the goal set out in section 2(c), and the considerations identified in section 
47(2)(e); and the third, the goal in section 2(e) and the considerations in section 
47(2)(f).  The court divorced itself from making a pronouncement and said: 
„Whether the conditions formulated by the Commission promote these concerns in a rational 
and appropriate fashion is a question, in the first place, for the Minister.  It is for the 
Minister to decide how the competing purposes identified in the Act should best be 
achieved. It may be that there is merit in the claims of Wal-Mart that the conditions are not 
as precisely formulated as they should be, or not closely connected to the reasons provided 
by the Commission, but these are matters we need not, and do not, decide in this judgment.  
For even if Wal-Mart is correct in these submissions, it does not follow that it is appropriate 
for Wal-Mart to bypass the section 49 procedure where these very issues can be considered 
by the Minister.‟79  
 
According to the Supreme court therefore „[t]o permit Wal-Mart to challenge these 
conditions imposed by the Commission when it approved the merger transaction 
without first letting the section 49 review process run its course, would be to 
undermine the statutory scheme that empowers the Minister to review the 
                                                 
78 Section 3(3) of the Foreign Investment Act provides that a foreigner engaged in business activities in 
Namibia, shall not be required “to provide for the participation” of the Namibian government or any 
Namibian citizen as a shareholder or partner in such business. 





Commission‟s decision on the merger.‟80 In the view of the court procedurally if, 
once the Minister has concluded the review, Wal-Mart considers that any conditions 
that have been stipulated are irrational or vague or unlawful, it may then challenge 
those conditions.  
The court further noted that the time periods provided in section 49 are maximum 
time periods, which may be shortened by the Minister where circumstances 
require.81  Further given the provisions of section 49(2) of the Act, which require the 
Minister to give interested parties an opportunity to comment on the proposed 
merger, ten days was indeed an impractically short period.82   The reasoning is that 
 „As the Competition Act makes plain, mergers can have many public policy 
implications that need to be considered prior to their being approved. In addition, 
there may be a range of interested parties who may wish to be heard on the 
implications of the merger.  Parties to proposed merger transactions need to accept 
that compliance with national competition processes is required.  It should be noted 
that at the time of writing this judgment, the South African approval that Wal-Mart 
expected to be finalized by May 2010, has still not finally been obtained.‟   
 
In conclusion the Supreme Court  set aside the order made by the High court 
declaring the conditions imposed by the NaCC in approving the merger, to be 
unlawful and invalid and held in addition that the matter be revert to the Minister 
of Trade and Industry to proceed with the review process. The court specifically 
said: 
„In conclusion, the appellants‟ arguments that Wal-Mart should have exhausted the 
section 49 ministerial review procedure before seeking an order that the conditions 
imposed by the Commission when it approved the merger succeeds.  The order made by 
the High Court declaring the conditions to be unlawful and invalid will therefore be set 
aside.  The ministerial review should therefore proceed.  Because of the time that this 
litigation has taken, the time limits stipulated in section 40 of the Act have expired, and it 
will be appropriate for this Court to declare that the review will be deemed to have been 
launched on the date that judgment is handed down in this matter.‟ 
 
The court asserted that if once the Minister has concluded the review, and Wal-
Mart considers that any conditions that have been stipulated are irrational or vague 
or unlawful, only than may it challenge those conditions.  It may well be, however, 
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that any complaints Wal-Mart has about the imposed conditions are resolved during 
the review process, the court concluded. 
3.8 The Minister’s determination after the Supreme Court Judgment 
 
After the decision of the Supreme Court the Minister of Trade and Industry had to 
comply with the decision of the said court to revise the conditions and make a 
determination as to which conditions exactly should apply to the merger between 
Massmart and Wal-Mart. This determination was made by the Minister on 2 April 
2012.83 In his determination the Minister confirmed the decision of the NaCC which 
approved the merger of Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated and Massmart Holdings Limited 
and imposed conditions. The conditions included that: 
 The Merged Entity must ensure that there are no retrenchments, based on the 
Merged Entity‟s operational requirements in Namibia, resulting from the 
transaction, for a period of two  years from the effective date of the transaction84  
 The Merged Entity must honour existing labour agreements and must continue to 
recognise representative trade unions in Namibia to represent the bargaining units, 
for a period of two years from the effective date of the Transaction.85  
 The Merged Entity must consult with the Minister of Trade and Industry with 
regard to the establishment of a programme of activities for domestic supplier 
development which the Merged Entity must implement. The Merged Entity must 
obtain the approval of the Minister  of Trade and Industry for such programme 
within 12 months of the date of this determination86  
 
                                                 
83 Government Gazzette Number No. 4918 Government Notice Number 94 Notice of determination by 
Minister in relation to review of decision of Namibian Competition Commission in relation to the proposed 
merger: Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated // Massmart Holdings Limited 2 April 2012. 
84 Ibid para 4.2 
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The Minister also sought to comply with the principles of natural justice by giving 
reasons for the determination and conditions imposed. The given reasons87  are very 
important and included that: 
a) The conditions originally imposed by the Competition Commission were 
considered by the High Court not to be specific. 
b) Submissions made by the parties to the review by the Minister and the public, 
both written and oral, during  the opportunities provided for such submissions to 
be made, were taken into account in the  formulation of the conditions attached to 
the approval of the merger. 
c) The provisions of the Act, in particular sections 2 and 47(2), were taken into 
account in making the determination in terms of section 49(3) of the Act. 
d) The conditions attached to the approval of the merger by the Minister were 
imposed taking into account public interest considerations relating to potential 
risks to Namibia‟s economy and industrialization, employment as well as the 
growth of the small and medium enterprise sector. The Minister in this regard 
considered that the conditions strike an appropriate balance between the potential 
economic benefits of the merger and public interest considerations. 
e) The Minister noted that while conditions attached to the approval of a merger 
were important to safeguard the public interest, the Act provided for substantive 
remedies over the entire duration of operations of the Merged Entity in Namibia, 
concerning potential restrictive practices and or abuse of dominance. 
f) The Minister noted that the merger approval in terms of the Act, whether 
conditional or unconditional, does not substitute for or affect any other law, any 
permission required under any other law, or the requirement for compliance with 
any other law. 
 
3.9 Wal-Mart Case- South Africa 
The role of the South African Competition Act88 requires the Competition 
Commission to investigate not only whether the proposed transaction will result in a 
                                                 





substantial lessening or prevention of competition in South Africa, but also whether 
it will impact negatively on various public interest matters.  
These „public interest‟ matters are the effect that the merger will have on 
employment or a particular industrial sector or region; the ability of small businesses 
or firms controlled by historically disadvantaged people to become competitive and 
the ability of national industries to compete in international markets. In the Wal-
Mart case in South Africa, which is summarised below, the Competition Appeal 
court specifically said the following:  
„[T]he introduction of the largest retailer in the world to the South African economy 
may pose significant challenges for the participation of South African producers in  
global value chains which, as the evidence indicates within the retailing sector, is  
dominated by Wal-Mart. Failure to engage meaningfully with the implications of 
this challenge posed by globalisation can well have detrimental economic and social 
effects for the South African economy in general and small and medium sized 
business in particular‟89 
 
In recent years, the South Africa Competition Commission has placed more 
emphasis on the „public interest‟ aspects of its jurisdiction and conditions 
intended to address the impact of proposed mergers on employment in South 
Africa such as moratoria on retrenchments have been imposed in a significant 
number of transactions. 
The scope of the South African Competition Commission‟s power to protect 
the public interest was the subject matter of a protracted litigation in the recent 
major merger in which the international food retailing giant Wal-Mart acquired 
the Southern African supermarket chain Massmart. The merger did not raise any 
competition concerns, because the acquirer was a new entrant into South Africa 
and its market. Accordingly the South African Competition Commission 
recommended that the transaction be approved without any conditions. 
 Wal-Mart has three retail formats in the form of discount stores, 
supercentres as well as neighbourhood markets. In addition, the company has a 
chain of warehouse stores called Sam‟s club, which sells groceries and general 
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merchandise mostly in bulk. Internationally at the time of the transaction, Wal-
Mart operated in 15 countries90. The primary target firm in the case was Massmart 
Holdings (Massmart).  
A company incorporated under the company laws of the Republic of South 
Africa and listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Massmart had an 
excess of 10 subsidiaries in South Africa and around the African continent. 
Massmart is a wholesaler and retail of grocery products, liquor and general 
merchandise sold in its four divisions91. 
In 2012 the South African Tribunal approved the merger between Wal-Mart 
and Massmart. The Tribunal had approved the merger with several conditions 
namely: the establishment of a supplier development fund, no retrenchments for 2 
years and the employment preference for 503 workers who had been retrenched 
by Massmart in 2010. These retrenchments were widely seen as a “preparatory 
step” for the Wal-Mart take-over.  
The trade unions and the government ministries challenged the Wal-Mart 
take-over in the Competition Tribunal and raised concerns of public interest. The 
three government ministries argued that Wal-Mart would significantly increase 
imports, particularly from low-cost Asian countries and thereby harm small South 
African suppliers. Trade Unions also raised the concern that Wal-Mart would 
discourage union participation in the Massmart stores, and offer less favourable 
conditions of employment to workers in the Massmart stores. 
To this, the Competition Appeal court ruled that the public interest factors 
could relate to the direct and specific risks arising out of the merger for local 
production and employment and could be a substitute for, or even a significant 
component of, broader industrial policy. The court referred to various sections of 
the Act and in one of the paragraphs said: 
„Given Wal-Mart‟s size and expertise…the proposal for a condition which would 
seek to enhance the participation of South African small and medium size producers 
in particular, in global value chains which are dominated by Wal-Mart so as to 
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prevent job losses, at the least, and, at best, to increase both employment and 
economic activity of these businesses protected under s 12 A must form part of the 
considerations which this Court is required to be taken into account in considering a 
merger of this nature…This flows from the model of competition law chosen by the 
legislature and in particular as set out in s 12 A. It also forms part of the mandate 
given to the Tribunal and, on appeal, to this Court when faced with the inquiry as to 
whether a merger should be approved‟.   
 
Accordingly, the court approved a requirement that the merged company 
contribute to local suppliers development fund to encourage small and medium 
sized enterprises affected by the merger, but not on a scale that would be 
tantamount to the merged company having to subsidize its competitors. The court 
further held that the merged companies should reinstate the 503 employees that 
were previously retrenched by Wal-Mart and in addition that there should not be 
any employment losses for a period of two years. 
The Tribunal also emphasized the issue of maintenance of employment and 
ordered that the merged entity must when employment opportunities become 
available, give preference to the 503 employees who were retrenched in June 
2010. However, the Competition Appeal court ordered that these employees must 
be reinstated as it found that the retrenchment of these workers was sufficiently 
related to the merger. Other employment related conditions imposed by the court 
included a monitorium on retrenchments based on the merged entity's operational 
requirements for a period of two years and that the merged entity must honour 
existing labour agreements and current practice of bargaining with SACCAWU 
(the largest representative union) 
3.10 Public Interest considerations 
In Namibia, the Competition Commission has an unfettered discretion to 
consider any public interest factor that is necessary when it looks into issues 
concerning merger investigations.92 In terms of section 47(2). „The NaCC may 
base its determination of a proposed merger on any criteria which it considers 
relevant to the circumstances involved in the proposed merger. Public interest 
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factors including maintaining or promoting exports, „promoting stability‟ (albeit 
only in industries designated by the relevant minister), and even „obtaining a 
benefit for the public‟, can also be used to justify an exemption for otherwise anti-
competitive agreements.93 While „public interest‟ is also cited as a potential basis 
for interim relief in the context of investigations into anti-competitive agreements 
or abuses of dominance, no specific factors are mentioned94  
The Act contain general provisions on public interest and specifically states 
that its purpose is to “enhance the promotion and safeguarding of competition in 
Namibia”. This is a public interest, provision. According to Hantke-Domas public 
interest in the legal context has more to do with the realisation of political and 
moral values. It is this concept of public interest that informs the decision-makers 
on how to decide disputes where there is a conflict.95  The “values" articulated in 
the Competition Act are to be found not only in the broadly worded preamble and 
purpose sections of the legislation but also in specific sections within the statute. 
The author further argues that judicial interpretation of public interest in this 
context: „constitutes a limitation of the legal scope of government's intervention in 
the economy, and provides the judiciary with a rhetorical base for resolving 
questions of political economy.‟ 
The Act  also provides for the consideration by the NaCC of “public interest” 
factors in addition to the impact of the merger on competition in Namibia, in 
order to protect both Namibian consumers as well as small and medium local 
enterprises. This includes the impact of a merger or acquisition on the promotion 
of employment and the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, in particular 
to increase ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons. 
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Economics of Public Interest Provisions in South African Competition Policy (2012) Available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/SIxth-Annual-Competition-Law-Economics-and-Policy-
Conference-in-South-Africa-2012/NewFolder-3/The-economics-of-public-interest-provisions-in-South-





The Tribunal, per David Lewis stated, however, that he was „quite 
comfortable with the requirement that we must balance competition and public 
interest considerations‟. Further that although: 
„[I]it makes for complex decision making…real politiek, at least, dictates that we do 
not insist on eliminating either the "political economy" or distributional objectives 
or “the pure economy" or allocative efficiency objectives. The trick is reconciling 
them in practice, and this in turn, is tied up, first, with the process of building a 
new, broad-based constituency for antitrust and, second, with the mode of 
implementation of policy and regulation‟ 
 
Although Lewis advocated a process of reconciliation, early decision making 
by the Competition Tribunal appeared to indicate that where a public interest 
consideration was the bailiwick of another governmental agency, the role of the 
competition authorities should be secondary to those agencies and statutes.96  
The NaCC is therefore required to investigate effects of a merger that go 
beyond the realm of purely competition concerns and economic principles. These 
public interest factors have proven crucial in some recent high-profile cases in 
Namibia97. It is however not hindered from considering other pieces of legislation 
before considering public interest issues. This takes us to the reasoning of the 
South African Competition Tribunal in the case of Distillers Corporation (SA) 
and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Group SACT, 2003 where the Tribunal said: 
„where there are other appropriate legislative instruments to redress the public 
interest, we must be cognisant of them in determining what is left for us to do 
before we can consider whether the residual public interest, that is that part of the 
public interest not susceptible to or better able to be dealt with under another law, is 
substantial.‟98 
 
Indeed, although it is correct to make these arguments, adopting a deferential 
approach does not mean a hands-off approach. The Act gives one a discretion which 
must be exercised where appropriate. The approach set out in the Act indicates that 
one may view public interest through a competition prism hence the Act and public 
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This Chapter has indicated that the Wal-Mart case in Namibia left such a great 
significant legal precedent regarding mergers, the role and importance of 
competition law and the Competition Commission of Namibia (NaCC) in its 
endeavour to implement and enforce the competition law in the Republic.  
The case is a microcosm as it shows that the expansion of businesses across the 
borders brings with it complex aspects of mergers and competitions laws. The 
mergers of international and local business operators are not just an economic or 
business issue but it also includes welfare and public interest issue that needs a 
balancing exercise. The balancing exercise is best achieved through political 
offices but if one is aggrieved he/she can still approach the judiciary for remedies. 
The essence of this case is that competition law is at the core of the development 
of every economy and the general populace.  It can be deduced that the court in 
South Africa is more pro-active, efficient and assertive in making decisions and 
independently imposing conditions in merger related issues of competition law 
especially those involving issues of public interest as compared to Namibia where 
there courts remain silent and reluctant to do so. In my view the former approach 
is more commendable where the concern is one of public interest, this is so 
because the South African Act does not spell out clearly what is intended by the 
legislature and left the issues for determination by courts. 
 
                                                 






Overall Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Introduction  
This Chapter contains an overall analysis and discussion, of the effects the 
Namibia judgment in the Wal-Mart case has on the development of mergers 
(competition law) in Namibia. It analyses the question whether it hinders or 
enhances such development. 
4.2 General considerations 
Before going deeper into the analysis, it must be mentioned that both 
judgments analysed above shared the same issue of concern that is the 
consideration of public interests in relation to mergers. When looking at the 
concerns raised by the courts an interesting fact of competition policy followed by 
corporations from developed nations and those from the developing world comes 
to light. Two primary schools of thought as they surface in the studies of 
competition law emerge here: the first one is the view from US policymakers that 
the major aim of competition policy is to achieve maximum efficiency. This is 
clear as we understand that large corporations such as Wal-Mart are based on 
policies that focus on consumer welfare with the maintenance of competitive 
markets as their goal.100 
The judgements also show that the Namibian Act has certain non-
competition provisions. As has been noted above, the Namibian Act has specific 
public interest goals incorporated in it and the courts noted this point. This tells 
one why the courts have to balance various interests and the NaCC enjoined to 
balance various conflicting interests under the Act itself. When this happens the 
regulation of competition is considered an instrument for economic development 
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which seeks to correct the socio-economic imbalances of a particular country as a 
result of its peculiar history and development.101  
4.3 Divergence and convergence 
It must be mentioned however that  although the two Namibian courts where 
faced with the same legal issue in the same case they diverged in their findings 
and in the manner of dealing with issues of public interest more specifically in 
terms of the conditions to be imposed  to the merger. The two courts had a 
different approach and outcome. 
Against the background of the High Court judgment on the conditions 
imposed in the Wal-Mart case the following inferences can be drawn: firstly that 
the NaCC should avoid conflict with the provisions of enacted laws, in particular, 
it should exclude as a condition, the participation of the government or a 
Namibian citizen as a shareholder or partner in an envisaged business, unless such 
relates to natural resources as provided for in the provisions of s3 (3) of the 
Foreign Investment Act102.  
Secondly, the ground of arbitrariness, vagueness and irrationality can be 
remedied if the NaCC identifies and communicates its intention to impose the 
condition, and its inclusion of Namibians who were previously disadvantaged 
provided that a reasonable apprehension exists that the merger parties may not be 
committed to this goal. By doing so the NaCC would avoid being challenged on 
the ground of procedural fairness. With regards to the constitutionality of the 
Competition Act on local people as referred to in s2 (f) and s47 (2) (f), s47 (2) 
sets out matters that the NaCC may consider when making a determination 
whether to approve or decline to approve a proposed merger103.  
These sections are valid and constitutional, in that they are not in variance 
with the provisions of the Constitution, save for stating that these sections do not 
require the NaCC to impose a condition on merger parties to provide for local 
                                                 







participation, as shareholder or partner in business or to transfer business to 
previously disadvantaged persons, as a condition for granting approval for a 
proposed merger. Rather the NaCC under the provisions of the Act can acquire 
additional information from the merger parties when making a determination and 
this information can be used to ensure that ownership stakes of historically 
disadvantaged persons are promoted for example, requirements to furnish 
affirmative action compliance certificates104. 
While confirming the approval of the merger the Supreme Court opted not to 
pronounce itself on the conditions imposed to the merger by NaCC and which 
conditions were subsequently invalidated by the High Court of Namibia before, 
instead the Supreme Court referred the matter back to the Minister of Trade and 
Industry for the compliance of the ministerial review procedure of such conditions 
mostly on the basis of administrative procedure and to somewhat extend public 
interest. This meant that the merger remained valid and in action subject to the 
ministerial review of the conditions. 
In comparison the South African court not only confirmed all the conditions 
to the merger as were set down by Competition Tribunal but the court even went 
further and ordered that not only did Wal-Mart have to give priority to employees 
that were previously retrenched but that Wal-Mart now had to reinstate all the 503 
employees that previously lost their employment. In addition the court ordered 
that Wal-Mart had to provide a fund worth R200 million to assist with the 
development and streamlining of the small and medium enterprises in South 
Africa. 
It is safe to state that the South African court by pronouncing itself   and 
imposing further conditions on the proposed merger in fact exercised the 
discretion inherent in its jurisdiction and in so doing upholding the notion of 
public interest.   
This point holds as we understand that the duty rests on the court to 
determine when to and when not to exercise such discretion and in this instance 
one can hail the South African court for doing so on the basis that by imposing the 






conditions the court did not only protect public interest, the rights of the end 
consumer but also protected the interests and rights of small medium enterprisers 
in South Africa, taking in to consideration the impact the merger would have had 
on both the South African local businesses and consumers. 
What stands out from the foregoing is the ability of the court to strike a 
balance between competing interests of social and economic welfare of the 
consumers and businesses on the one hand and competition issues on the other 
and still be able to make a decision that is aimed at safeguarding these equally 
important interests. This explains why the South African Court in the Wal-
Mart/Massmart case said:   
„[W]hat weight is to be given to the factors set out in s 12 A (3) in order to 
determine whether these should trump a finding based on more traditional 
considerations of consumer welfare as captured in s 12 A (2)?” 57 and “An 
engagement with an exercise of proportionality is then required to determine how to 
balance the competing arguments. While this exercise may, by its nature and for the 
reasons set out above, never be precise, it is what the Act appears to require in 
respect of mergers” and later “[A] proportionality exercise requires evidence which 
would enable the exercise, justify the calculation which flows there from and permit 
a balance to be struck between the competing issues of consumer welfare, 
employment and small business‟105 
 
In Namibia it must be noted that, the benefit of previously disadvantaged 
people and the promotion of local businesses is reminiscent of this and both cases on 
the Wal-Mart show this as decided under the governing competition laws analysed 
above.106 In South Africa the case of Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Tepco 
Petroleum (Pty) Ltd,107 is seminal. The Tribunal said: 
„The Commission‟s role is to promote and protect competition and a specified 
public interest. It is not to second – guess the commercial decisions of precisely that 
element of the public that it is enjoined to defend, particularly where no threat to 
competition is entailed …. The Competition authorities, however well intentioned, 
are well advised not to pursue their public interest mandate in an over-zealous 
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manner, lest they damage precisely those interests that they ostensibly seek to 
protect.‟ 
 
Further it is indicative of the independence and transparency of the court to 
adjudicate matters and bring them to a speedy finality, without fear and free from 
any implied internal or external influence or interference.  The same cannot be said 
with the current situation in Namibia. 
The above holds as we understand that firstly, the High Court of Namibia 
confirmed the merger and invalidated all the conditions. On appeal the Supreme 
Court confirmed the High Court‟s ruling in respect of the merger however 
overturned it‟s ruling invalidating the conditions to the merger. 
Secondly the Supreme Court held that the matter should be referred back to the 
Minister for review of such conditions before the courts can be approached for 
further recourse. The court stressed the importance of complying and exhausting 
available internal remedies of recourse before taking the matter to court, stating that 
to bypass such procedure would undermine the review powers vested in the 
Minister. 
 
4.4 Implications for the economy and national growth 
Even though the Supreme Court of Namibia had the discretion to confirm or 
block the conditions to the merger it opted not to exercise its discretion in this case. 
Whether this was the best or preferred approach in terms of public interest and the 
effects the merger had on small and medium enterprises in Namibia, is arguable on 
the basis that a Minister is a politician who may well be exposed to external or 
internal factors such as corruption, undue influence, malpractices, political 
considerations etc, which might have an influence on his decision.  
The Minister is no doubt a person of integrity and should be impartial when 
making decisions, however one should not lose sight of the fact that the element of 
biasness does exist even in the most minimal possibility. This should not be taken 
lightly. It is my argument that it was pre-mature for the court to have the matter 





procedural technicality where the benefit is greater than the harm caused on public 
interest grounds. It is sometimes important to consider how a merger would benefit 
the nation than being sensational about public interest. As the representative of Wal-
Mart said in his testimony in the Wal-Mart case in South Africa: 
„[O]ne would expect the best of the small South African suppliers to have opportunities to export via 
the Wal-Mart network of stores elsewhere in the world.” and “Suppliers have the opportunity to 
extend their reach considerably by being part of Wal-Mart‟s global supplier family‟108 
 
In this context a merger can present an opportunity for the growth of local small 
businesses. This is the meaning and or implication of this testimony. Therefore these 
considerations were not taken into consideration or at least they were overshadowed 
by the perceived monopoly of the global giant that Wal-Mart is compared to local 
investors. 
On the flip side one can advance an argument that there is no written law in 
Namibia that procedural adherence supersedes issues of public interest where the 
rights of the people or businesses are most likely to be affected by the activation of 
the merger, if anything the idea of administrative justice is more inclined and geared 
to protect and advance the principle of public interest by ensuring fairness and 
giving a voice to the voiceless.  
Further, when a court makes a decision it sets a precedent and to a certain 
extend indirectly makes law. Although the Act provides for the review process by 
the Minister, the Supreme Court being the highest court of the land has by virtue of 
its jurisdiction the power and ability to deviate from the provision of the Act 
provided is gives reasons for such variation. In light of the issues the court was faced 
with, it was clear that the issues went deeper and beyond competition law. Therefore 
it would have been appropriate, justifiable and more assistive if the Supreme Court 
pronounced itself on the conditions that were imposed on the merger. In so doing the 
court could have set a precedent and a potential direction on how to handle matters 
of a similar nature in future rather than referring the matter for ministerial review. 
This clearly shows that even where there exists a great likelihood of severe 
harm to social and economic welfare and public interest, the Namibian court held as 
                                                 





its objective procedural adherence above all, even at the expense of the above 
factors. This may explain why the Supreme Court said: 
„[T]he range of considerations set out in both section 2 and section 47(2) make 
plain that the decision whether to approve a proposed merger involves questions 
relating to the promotion and safeguarding of competition in Namibia, as the title of 
the Act suggests, but also other public interest considerations relating to the 
promotion of employment opportunities, the protection and promotion of small and 
medium-sized enterprises and the expansion of the participation of historically 
disadvantaged people in the Namibian economy.   The decision is one that requires 
“an equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or 
considerations.”109 Precisely how these differing goals should be balanced within 
the framework of the Act in relation to each proposed merger is a question that both 
the Commission and the Minister will have to address in the exercise of their 
statutory powers.  This is a decision that the Act specifically assigns first to the 
Commission and then to the Minister.  As the Commission is an institution specially 
constituted to consider competition matters, and the Minister bears both 
constitutional and democratic responsibility for trade and industry, these are 
assignments that should not lightly be bypassed.‟ 
 
The question of independence of the court in pronouncing itself in this particular 
matter remains both a challenge and arguable.  
As we have seen, the South African court has opted to use its discretion, and 
pronounced itself and imposed a condition which was best suited in light of the 
facts that were placed before it. Whether the conditions, so imposed where the 
most preferred, is not the point of contention of this dissertation but the ability 
and independence of the court to exercise the discretion vested in it to bring a 
matter to finality on the ground of public interest. This is something the Namibia 
court can learn and borrow from the South African judgment.  
4.5 The fear of the death of the local entrepreneurships 
There is a general fear that when a giant foreign investor is allowed to operate in 
the country the local economy will suffer in the form of retrenchment of workers and 
closure of small enterprises. This fear was evidenced in both the Supreme Court and 
High Court arguments. This fear is apparent and indeed has some factual backing. 
Whether it would happen in Namibia or not is not apparent though because no such 
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huge investment or merger has ever been experienced in the country under the 
current legal regime.  
The fear also comes from the general feeling that the foreign investor will 
favour foreign produced products and not locally produced goods. This will mean 
that local producers will lose the market because the biggest supplier is sourcing 
stock or products elsewhere. This was unacceptable to the Unions and some sectors 
of the government which promote the “Buy Namibia” slogan. This has to be 
understood in the context of the Edcon/Dawn case of South Africa where it the 
Tribunal said: 
„Firstly a condition of that sort goes to the very heart of anti-trust‟s concern with the 
welfare of consumers. If Edcon favours international over domestic suppliers it is 
presumably because the company believes that it can procure higher quality and/or 
lower priced merchandise on the international market. As long as the retail market 
is competitive – and our view is that, residual anxieties surrounding what appears to 
be a creeping pattern of acquisitions aside, the clothing retail segment remains 
competitive – then a significant part of the benefits of these lower prices and 
superior quality commodities must be passed on to consumers, including working 
people. While we agree with SACTWU that this is cold comfort to those whose 
inability to find employment condemns them to very low levels of consumption, 
there is considerable evidence to suggest that the past 20 years have witnessed a 
significant growth in the purchasing power of previously disadvantaged consumers. 
Nor is this phenomenon only discernible in the form of the super rich – of greater 
significance is the rise of a mass middle and lower-middle class of consumers. This 
is clearly the outcome of a great many factors but there is no gainsaying the role 
played by lower interest rates and product prices over the period.‟ 
 
Therefore increased competition through mergers and acquisitions can lead 
to increased buying power of the consumers especially the low income consumers 
and that includes lowly paid workers.    
     Wal-Mart is the biggest retailer in the world. It has the largest global value chain in the 
world owing to the fact that it has its operations in 15 different countries around the 
world as stated before. This operations gives Wal-Mart the advantage of sourcing goods 
from anywhere in the world from the countries  in its supply chain to any country in the 
world and still be able to sell these good on a low price. With the support of a good value 
chain, Wal-Mart has the power, resources and ability to expand its supply chain to any 
country around the world through mergers with local businesses of the intended country. 
Namibia and South Africa became part of this global value chain with the entrance of 
Wal-Mart in the two countries. 
     However, the idea of globalisation is one that goes deeper, for it can present both risks 





chain, Wal-Mart has a score up against the local business in terms of importing goods and 
low pricing of goods. This can hurt the local businesses that do not have the resources, 
capacities, machinery and finance to compete at the level that Wal-Mart is competing. 
This can run the local business out of business in the long run as a result of their anti-
competitiveness in the markets. At the same time it also presents opportunities like 
employment, low priced goods or allows local businesses to develop. 
     The risks and opportunities involved can be increased or reduced by the courts 
through the imposition of condition on mergers aimed at promoting the intended 
opportunities and reducing the risks involved. The law can only be effective through 
implementation by the courts or by reviewing the current law so that the Competition 
Commission is vested with full power to deal with all matters relating to competition law, 
this means foregoing and abandoning the ministerial review process because a  minister 
being a politician is not the right vehicle to deal with matters of this nature. 
4.6 Analysing further developments in Namibia 
At the time of writing this dissertation the Minister of Trade and Industry has 
reviewed and has confirmed the conditions in terms of the gazette published110. 
The conditions included that there would not be any retrenchment for two years, 
there should be recognition of existing labour agreements and representative trade 
unions, and there should be a programme for the development of domestic 
supplier activities.  
It is yet not confirmed whether Wal-Mart accepted the conditions or intends 
to appeal against these conditions. It is most likely that Wal-Mart will appeal 
against the conditions given the status quo of the case. 
If Wal-Mart appeals, this will be understood because conditions to a merger 
or a take-over issue are not necessarily a wheel towards local industry 
development. This was recognized in the Edcon/Dawn case where the Tribunal 
said:  
„[E]xpressed otherwise this issue is not merger specific. SACTWU‟s concerns 
about cheaper imports cannot be cured by the imposition of a merger condition on a 
single firm. It is a sector-wide, phenomenon and must be addressed at that 
aggregated level with the appropriate instruments.‟111 
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In terms of the Act the NaCC is empowered to regulate all issues of 
competition concern in the Republic. However, what is clear from the Wal-Mart 
saga in Namibia is that even though the NaCC has all these great powers vested in 
it by virtue of the enabling statute, The NaCC appears to be a watch dog with no 
teeth at all because whatever decision or condition it imposes on any merger is 
subject to the final review by the Minister of Trade and Industry.  Thus, it is the 
Minister who holds the ultimate power to oversee and make the final decision of 
either confirming, amending or to refuse any conditions that the NaCC may have 
proposed. 
The NaCC is presumably an independent body in terms of the Act but the 
transparency of such independence is not evident in light of cases dealt with by 
the NaCC so far.  It is my opinion that to subject the NaCC to the Minister of 
Trade and Industry for any decision of competition concern is not viable and 
detracts from its independence. Owing to the fact that the Minister is a political 
appointee he may be inclined to serve both government and party interests. The 
procedural step provided for in s49 is not only unnecessary but it creates a delay 
and a conflict in the decision making process between the NaCC and the Minister.  
An argument can be advanced that the NaCC should stand as a completely 
independent body that is tasked to determine and make decisions of competition 
concern solely. In the event that any party is dissatisfied with a decision taken by 
the NaCC, the only step and further recourse should be an appeal against decision 
in a court of law instead of ministerial review. 
4.7 Implications of the South African Wal-Mart Cases for Namibia  
Similar to what other countries have experienced in recent years, Wal-Mart‟s 
entry into the South African economy will have no big different consequences for 
Namibia.  The retail giant might offer goods at lower cost or prices and lure 
consumers to shop with them but it is no doubt that Wal-Mart‟s employees and its 
suppliers will be the ones to experience the harsh reality of paying the real price 
as an indirect consequence of the merger. They will be faced with extreme 





even meet their basic needs. Namibia has witnessed first-hand experience with 
Namibia‟s former Ramatex workers112. Namibia has seen how Ramatex workers 
were treated, not only did they work long hours (overtime) without pay, workers 
could barely live on the small salaries they were earning and the working 
conditions were not conducive. The union complaint about the Ramatex situation 
but despite negotiations the corporation refused to increase workers salaries or 
change their working hours and improve their working conditions. This led to the 
eventual shutting down of its operation in Namibia.  
From a development perspective, there are many questions to be asked:  are 
some conditions like those placed on Wal-Mart in the South Africa enough to 
prevent such destructive consequences? Will Wal-Mart ever source from local 
suppliers? Are our laws sufficient to prevent the abuse of workers and 
environment by corporate giants? Can Namibian laws safeguard the interests of 
small, local businesses and workers while playing according to the rules of a 
ruthless global economy?113 
Wal-Mart‟s track record clearly indicates that the retail giant is not concerned 
with local development needs and thus it would be naïve to believe that its 
behaviour in Namibia and South Africa would be different. The time has come to 
learn from history, to become selective when dealing with investments and to 
implement a development strategy that delivers social benefits such as 
overcoming poverty, unemployment ad meeting the basic needs of the people. 
Wal-Mart has nothing to offer in this regard.114  Competition law can play a major 
role here as an intermediary by embracing the principle of public interests through 
the imposition of conditions on mergers when approving them. The conditions 
that can be imposed can range from the working conditions of workers, loss of 
jobs and minimum remuneration etc. 
On the other hand dealing with public interest issues and striking a balance 
between the social and economic welfare of the people is a complex matter and a 
                                                 







challenge both on the competition authorities and the on the courts. Thus in the 
Wal-Mart/Massmart case the Competition Appeal Court of South Africa said: 
„[T]here is merit in the argument that the Act should be read in terms of an 
economic perspective that extends beyond a standard consumer welfare approach. 
By virtue of an embrace of the goals of a free market and effective competition 
together with uniquely South African elements…..the legislature imposed ambitious 
goals upon the competition authorities created in terms of the Act. Within the 
context of the present dispute, this ambition is further captured in s12 A which 
mandates an enquiry into substantial public interest grounds‟115 
 
As there are always competing interests or rights that are equally important, 
the determination of these rights can be more detrimental than beneficial many a 
times. However it may be argued whether it is really the court‟s jurisdiction to 




This Chapter has provided an overall analysis and discussion, of the effects the 
Namibia judgment in the Wal-Mart case has on the development of mergers (competition 
law) in Namibia. It analysed the question whether it hinders or enhances such 
development. 
Both judgments of the High and Supreme Court have been analysed and it has 
been shown that they shared the same issue of concern that is the consideration of public 
interests in relation mergers. When looking at the concerns raised by the courts there is an 
interesting revelation of competition policy followed by those corporations from 
developed nations and those from the developing world. In applying the Act to the 
complex issues involved in competition law the courts have to balance various interests 
and the NaCC is enjoined to balance various conflicting interests under the Act itself. The 
Chapter has shown that when mergers take place the regulation of competition is 
considered an instrument for economic development which seeks to correct the socio-
economic imbalances of a particular country as a result of its peculiar history and 
development.  
                                                 





Under the Act, procedurally, the Minister when exercising his statutory powers 
will have to consider the principles of natural justice as well. The decision is one that 
requires equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or 
considerations. This informs why the  Supreme Court referred the matter back to the  
Minister of Trade and Industry for the compliance of the review procedure of such 
conditions  by the Minister on the basis of administrative procedure and to somewhat 
extend  public interest. This meant that the merger remained valid and in action subject to 







Recommendations and Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction  
This Chapter considers the above analysis and preliminary conclusions made. 
It draws the final conclusions with specific reference to the research questions 
mentioned in Chapter one above. It is based on those conclusions that 
recommendations are made.  
5.2Recomendations and conclusions  
One may answer the questions by Jauch in the affirmative, that our laws are 
not sufficient to prevent the abuse of workers and the environment by corporate 
giants. That our laws are not sharp enough to safeguard the interests of small, 
local businesses and workers, if the institutions tasked to protect their rights play 
according to the rules of a ruthless global economy. Therefore, there is a need for 
law reform to strengthen these laws and move with global trends affecting 
competition law. 
Borrowing from the remarks of The former Minister of Trade and Industry in 
Namibia Dr. Hage Gaingob in response to the court‟s judgment, “the judgement 
has far more reaching implications for the future economic development of 
Namibia, and in particular the need for empowerment of the Namibians, whom 
the then apartheid South African administration have severely disadvantaged…”  
He further stated that “the law needs to be contextualized for the greater public 
good other than a strict technical interpretation thereof”116. 
     It follows that there exists a lacuna in the Namibian competition law that needs 
closing. This clearly calls for review or reform of the Act especially s2 which 
deals with the powers of the NaCC and s49 which provides for ministerial review 
of decisions made by the NaCC. As a result of the ambiguous framing of some 
                                                 





parts of the Act, it has become immensely difficult for the NaCC to implement 
and enforce the Act properly. 
To amplify the above point, it is important to note that the Commission itself 
is actually aware of the weaknesses it faces. The NaCC in its call for proposals for 
the review of the Act noted following: 
„Developments and changes in the fields of competition economics, law and policy, as well as the 
market dynamics are such that they render some of the provisions of the Act obsolete or out of 
touch with the public interests developments of the Namibian economy. Further, the coverage and 
scope of the Act needs a thorough review taking into account best practice developments 
internationally and regionally on the substantive provisions of the Act‟.  
 
Challenges in the implementation of some of the provisions of the Act are evidently visible in the 
work of the two core divisions of the Commission, namely the Restrictive Business Practices 
(“RBP”) division which is responsible for the implementation of Chapter 3 of the Act and the 
Mergers and Acquisitions (“M&A”) division which is responsible for the implementation of 
Chapter 4 of the Act. Further, the judicial provisions in Chapter 5 and 6 also need to be aligned to 
the legal developments concerning the mandate of the Competition Commission.‟117 
 
It is further recommended that the Act of Namibia be reviewed; specifically 
s2 must be drafted in such a way that it gives the NaCC full independence in all 
its operations and the sole mandate to make decisions in all matters of 
competition concern. In addition s49 which currently calls for the ministerial 
review process is an unnecessary step, which must be done away with completely. 
It does not only create delays, uncertainty and conflict in decision making powers 
between the two institutions but it also hinders on the independence of the NaCC, 
its confidence and ability to make decisions. 
It must be noted that even in free market economies, mergers and 
acquisitions have been recognized as not always being beneficial to the country‟s 
social and economic development. In Canada, for example, the takeover bid by 
BHP Bilton for Potash Corp was blocked by the government because it was seen 
as holding no benefits for the country118. Likewise, the Australian government 
blocked the Singapore Stock Exchange from taking over the Australian Stock 
                                                 
117 Namibia Competition Commission. Request for Proposals: Review of the Namibian Competition Act (2 
of 2003) and the Rules Made Thereunder (2008). Available at 
http://www.nacc.com.na/cms_documents/b0f_review_of_the_namibian_competition_act.pdf last accessed 
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Exchange. The Indian government is legally empowered to issue policy directives 
to the country‟s Competition Commission to safeguard public interests. Thus 
placing conditions on mergers and blocking them altogether is a common practice 
to safeguard social and economic interests against rampant global capitalism and 
the large corporations that drives it119. 
It can thus be concluded that the Wal-Mart merger situation in Namibia has 
not brought any feasible benefits to the country‟s economy, social well-being and 
the local businesses that can be witnessed today. The NaCC should not be poised 
to give in to pressures from corporate giants and should not be inclined to grant 
all mergers if they do not yield any benefits for the country, its people and its 
economy as well as promote development of the small and medium businesses. 
The determination should be made based on the question whether such merger 
will be beneficial to the country‟s social and economic welfare or whether such 
merger is viable and justifiable on public interest grounds. Where one of these 
questions is answered in the negative than such bid must be blocked or refused. 
Finally, perhaps it is also recommendable that government be legally empowered 
by legislation as in India, to issue policy directives to the NaCC to safeguard 
public interest where and when the need arises. Perhaps it is also reasonable to 
argue that, the time has come for the Namibia to establish an independent court 
that only deal with matters of competition concern like it is the case in South 
Africa.  
Further, it must be noted that any merger in general will have detrimental 
effect on some SMEs in Namibia hence the need for some concerted and 
systematic evaluation of the relevant effects of the merger before approval. The 
Supreme Court had to refer the matter back to the minister because looking at the 
situation there was not such evidence or evaluation on the ground.   
It is also important to note that the two judgement illustrate that the courts 
and other institutions are having difficulties in dealing with large corporations 
which come from outside to invest. Therefore it is a question of both competition 
and investment laws. To this end it is recommended that a balance between 






economic efficiency and equity be struck in both investment and competition 
laws. The OECD says something for South Africa in this context:  
„[P]olicies of equity and distribution as well as efficiency, and [that] they clearly incorporate 
goals and ideals for competition law derived from the early ANC positions and the 
stakeholder debate… recognising the problem of inefficiency and waste, but connects these 
too with equity, in noting not only that a credible competition law and institutions to 
administer it are necessary for an efficient economy, but also that an\efficient, competitive 
economic environment, balancing the interests of workers, owners and consumers and 
focussed on development, will benefit to all South Africans.‟ 
 
The Wal-Mart case in Namibia calls for the same imperative in Namibia and this 
OECD recommendation is very relevant since Namibia and South Africa have a 
shared history. The effects of Wal-Mart in South Africa can also be felt in Namibia 
and worse still when Wal-Mart has been allowed to have a direct stake in the 




This Chapter has provided an overall analysis and discussion of the effects the 
Namibian judgment in the Wal-Mart case has on the development of mergers 
(competition law) in Namibia. It analysed the question whether it hinders or enhances 
such development. 
Both judgments of the High and Supreme Court have been analysed and it has 
been shown that they shared the same issue of concern that is the consideration of public 
interests in relation to mergers. When looking at the concerns raised by the courts there is 
an interesting revelation of competition policy followed by corporations from developed 
nations and those from the developing world. In applying the Act to the complex issues 
involved in competition law, the courts therefore have to balance various interests and the 
Competition Commission is also enjoined to balance various conflicting interests under 
the Act itself. The Chapter has shown that when mergers take place the regulation of 
competition is considered an instrument for economic development which seeks to 
correct the socio-economic imbalances of a particular country as a result of its peculiar 





Under the Act, procedurally, the Minister in the exercise of his statutory powers 
will have to address and consider the principles of natural justice as well. The decision is 
one that requires equilibrium to be struck between a range of competing interests or 
considerations. This informs why the  Supreme Court referred the matter back to the  
Minister of Trade and Industry for the compliance of the review procedure of such 
conditions by the Minister on the basis mostly of administrative procedure and to 
somewhat extend public interest. This meant that the merger remained valid and in action 






LG Baxter Administrative Law (1984) Juta. 
B Benwell and E Stokoe. Discourse and identity. Edinburgh (2006) Edinburgh 
University Press.  
K Black, Quantitative Analysis (2004) New York Publishers USA 
M Bloor. „On the analysis of observational data: A discussion of the worth and uses 
of inductive techniques and respondent validation‟ (1978) Sociology, 
12(2):542-52. 
W Boshoff D Dingley & J Dingley. The Economics of Public Interest Provisions in 




African-competition-policy.pdf accessed on 15 August 2014. 
N Chabane. An Evaluation of the Influence of BEE on the Application of 
Competition Policy in South Africa‟ Paper presented at the Trade and 
Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) Annual Forum 2003. Cape Town: 
Development Policy Research Project, University of Cape Town, (2003) 
available at http://www.tips.org.za/events/event_details/paper/forum2003 
Accessed on 16 August 2014. 
V Chetty. The Place of Public Interest in South Africa‟s Competition Legislation 
Some Implications for International Antitrust Convergence (2001) Edward 
Nathan (Proprietary) Limited Johannesburg South Africa. 
M Crotty (ed.) The foundation of social research: Meaning and perspective in the 
research process. London (1998): Sage Publications  
A De Vos, S Strydom, C B Fouche, C S L Delport. Research at Grass Roots: For 
the Social Sciences and Human Service Professions. 3rdEdition. (2005) 





B Dundee, Article: Are merger conditions a viable instrument to achieve non-
economic goals in developing countries. (2012) Available at, 
www.comp.co.za, Accessed on 12 August 2014. 
C Fishman, The Wal-Mart effect: How the world’s most powerful company really 
Works and how it's transdeveloping the American economy (2006) New York 
The Penguin Press. 
S Gasparikova, Enforcing the Competition law in Namibia: A Toolkit 1, (2008). 
Cuts C-Cier  
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/namibia/ACTSII. 
Accessed on 16 August 2014. 
M Hante-Domas „The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non Existence or 
Misinterpretation?‟ (2003) 15(2) European Journal of Law and Economics.  
HS Harris & American Bar Association. Competition laws outside the United  States 
(2001) Chicago, I II Section of Antitrust Law  American Bar Association. 
MO Hende ELT Course Descriptions in Tertiary Education: A Critical-interpretative 
Investigation. Unpublished PhD thesis in Education (2009) University of 
Exeter.  
J Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa (2007) Juta at p478 - 482. 
M Hyslop Obstructive marketing: Restricting distribution of products and services in 
the age of asymmetric warfare (2014). Gower Publishing New York.  
H Jauch. „The Wal-Mart take-over, many reasons to be concerned.‟  The Namibian, 
9 August 2011. 
A Jones and B Sufrin „EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials‟ London 
Oxford University Pressat. 
K Kothari, Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques (1990) Vikos Publishing 
House. India 
A Kumar2006 „Relationship between Competition Authority and Sectoral Regulator‟  
Presentation made at SAFIR Workshop, Lahore, 25-26 March 2006 
Available at http://www.competition-commission 
india.nic.in/speeches_articles_presentations/9-PPT_Lahore_06.pdf accessed 





D Lewis, „The Political Economy of Antitrust‟ presentation made at the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute's 28th Annual Conference on International Antitrust 
Law and Policy, October 25 and 26, 2001 
B Lincoln and Guba, 2000 op cit; MQ Patton Qualitative research and evaluation 
methods 3rd ed (2002) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  
C Mapaure, Water Wars: Legal Pluralism and Hydropolitics in Namibian Water 
Law. Research Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Degree of 
Master of Laws (LLM) (2010) University of Namibia  
M Meyer Between theory, method and politics: Positioning of the approaches to 
CDA. In R Wodak and Meyer M (eds.) (2001) Methods of critical discourse 
analysis. London: SAGE publications Limited, pp.14-31 
J Mouton How to Succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral Studies A South African 
Guide and Resource Book. (2001) Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
L Reyburn, Competition Law of South Africa Durban (2004) Butterworths. 
N Rose Antitrust, Competition and Regulatory Bulletin, (2013). Norton Rose  
D Smith „Phenomenology: Methodology and method‟ In J Higgs (ed.) Qualitative 
research: Discourse on methodologies. Sydney (1997) Hampden Press  
R Stake The Art of Case Study Research (1995) Thousand Oaks Sage. 
A Tashakkori and C Teddlie Mixed methodology: Combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. London (1998) Sage Publications  
J Thorpe Power, rights, and inclusive markets (2013) Oxfam GB for Oxfam 
International. 
R Wodak and M Meyer (eds.). Methods of critical discourse analysis London (2001) 




Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC)  






 Metropolitan Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Momentum Group (SACT, 2010). 
Minister of Economic Development et al and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. et al case 
no 110/CAC/Jul11  
Nichol and Another v Registrar of Pension Funds and Others,  
Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd (Case No: 
66/LM/Oct01) 
University of Cape Town v the Ministers of Education and Culture 1988(3) 
SA 203 (C) 
Wal-Mart//Massmart holdings Wal-Mart stores Inc v Chairperson of the 
Namibian Competition Commission and others (A 61/2011)[2011] NAHC 
126 (28 April 2011) 
 
Statutes 
Namibia Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority (NAMFISA) Act 3 of 
2001  
Competition Act, 2 of 2003 
Namport Act, 2 of 1994 
Constitution of Namibia 
Foreign Investment Act 27 of 1990  
Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
 
